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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust policy today is an anomaly. On the one hand, antitrust is
thriving. The past twenty years witnessed more countries with antitrust
laws, and the birth and growth of the international organization of
governmental competition authorities, the International Competition
Network (“ICN”), with over 100 member countries.1 China, which viewed
until the late 1970s the term competition pejoratively as a “capitalist
monster,” now has competition laws.2 Domestically, the U.S. Department
of Justice Antitrust Division, decimated during the Reagan administration,3
has more prosecutors today than in the 1960s.4 Its 2010 budget, adjusted
1

Int’l Competition Network Steering Grp., The ICN’s Vision for its Second Decade,
Presented at the 10th Annual Conference of the ICN (May 2011),
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc755.pdf.
2
Xiaoye Wang, The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in
Progress, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 579, 580 (2009).
3
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: CHANGES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND
ACTIVITIES 4 (1990), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GGD-91-2 (“Between
fiscal years 1980 and 1989, the Division staff declined from 883 (including 429 attorneys)
to 468 (including 209 attorneys).”).
4
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., FY 2012 Congressional Budget Submission 48
(2011) (Antitrust Division’s 2012 budget had 880 authorized employee positions, of which
390
were
for
attorneys),
www.justice.gov/jmd/2012justification/pdf/fy12-atrjustification.pdf; Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE
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for inflation, is more than triple its 1965 level.5

3

The American Bar

Association’s Antitrust Section boasts over 8,000 “attorneys and nonlawyers from private law firms, in-house counsel, non-profit organizations,
consulting firms, federal and state government agencies, as well as judges,
professors and law students.”6 No other country affords private antitrust
plaintiffs the combination of (i) broad civil discovery largely determined by
the parties, rather than the courts,7 (ii) the ability to lower individual
litigation costs by bringing antitrust claims, at times, as a class,8 (iii)
automatic treble damages,9 (iv) recovery of the costs of a successful suit,
including reasonable attorney’s fees,10 (v) broad injunctive relief,11 (vi) a
per se illegal standard for evaluating price-fixing and other “hard-core”
cartel behavior,12 (vii) expansive jurisdictional rules, and (viii) the use of
collateral estoppel for follow-on private antitrust suits.13
Yet antitrust’s influence in the U.S. has diminished. One used to hear of
antitrust’s importance. The Supreme Court once called the federal antitrust
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 194 (Vintage 2008) (noting
300 Antitrust Division lawyers in 1962). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which
enforces both consumer protection and competition law, had 600 lawyers at the end of its
2010 fiscal year. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Performance & Accountability Report--Fiscal Year
2010, at 6 (Nov. 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/par.shtm.
5
Appropriation Figures for the Antitrust Division, Fiscal Years 1903-2012,
www.justice.gov/atr/public/atr-appropriation-figures.html. The Division’s 2010 budget
was $163,170,000. Its 1965 budget was $7,072,000 (id.), which adjusted for inflation,
equals approximately $48.9 million in 2010 dollars. DollarTimes, Inflation Calculator
(Aug. 3. 2011), http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm (last visited Aug. 11,
2011).
6
AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. OF ANTITRUST LAW, WHO WE ARE,
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/home.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2011).
7
FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
8
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
9
15 U.S.C. § 15.
10
Id.
11
15 U.S.C. § 26.
12
United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
13
15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (if the U.S. brings a civil or criminal antitrust action, and
testimony is taken, then any resulting final judgment or consent decree can be used as
prima facie evidence against defendants for the same conduct in later private antitrust
actions).
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laws “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” in preserving economic freedom
and the free-enterprise system.14 Today the Court complains about antitrust
suits,15 and places greater faith in the antitrust function being subsumed in a
regulatory framework.16

Presidential candidates once debated antitrust

policy. Now candidates rarely mention, much less debate, antitrust policy.17
Americans once had “a deep feeling of unrest” and fear of “another kind of
slavery” from the aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals
and corporations.18 By the mid-1960s antitrust became “complex, difficult,
and boring.”19 By 2003–4, many younger Americans were unconcerned
about economic concentration.20

Among the factors to explain this

disparity, Gallup’s chief economist identified the federal government not
14

United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895 (2007)
(complaining that antitrust’s per se illegal standard might increase litigation costs by
promoting “frivolous” suits); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 28182 (2007) (fearing “unusually” high risk of inconsistent results by antitrust courts); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-60 (2007) (antitrust’s “inevitably costly and
protracted discovery phase,” as hopelessly beyond effective judicial supervision) (quoting
Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003));
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (decrying antitrust’s “interminable litigation”).
16
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1124 (2009) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (when a “regulatory structure exists to deter and remedy anticompetitive
harm, the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than the benefits”); Credit
Suisse, 551 U.S. at 283; Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414-15; see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The
Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The American Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
629, 636 (2010).
17
Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1390-98 (2009) (discussing Wilson-Taft-Roosevelt debate over ruleof-reason standard, and Reagan administration’s departure from earlier Republican
administrations in antitrust enforcement).
18
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan, J.
dissenting).
19
Hofstadter, supra note 4, at 189.
20
Linda Lyons, Youthful Optimism? Young Americans Happy with “Big Business,”
Gallup, Mar. 2, 2004, http://www.gallup.com/poll/10816/Youthful-Optimism-YoungAmericans-Happy-Big-Business.aspx. Fifty-four percent of the Americans (ages 18 to 29)
were very or somewhat satisfied with the size and influence of major corporations, which
was fifteen percentage points higher than the next-most optimistic age group (30- to 49year-olds), and satisfaction with major corporations decreased even more among the older
age groups.
15
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pursuing monopolies the way it once did (therefore, younger people did not
have such a negative view of monopolies) and that the antitrust laws were
not emphasized in business school the way they once were.21 Few people
apparently followed the Government’s trial against Microsoft.22 When the
consent decree expired in 2011, several questioned what the remedy
accomplished.23
So as historian Richard Hofstadter asked in the mid-1960s, what
happened to the antitrust movement in the United States? “[O]nce the
United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions,”
observed Hofstadter; by the 1960s, there were “antitrust prosecutions
without an antitrust movement.”24

Today we have far fewer antitrust

prosecutions without an antitrust movement. Since the 1970s, the number
of private antitrust lawsuits25 and DOJ investigations under Sections 126 and

21

Id.
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Campaign Incidents Have Little
Punch (Dec. 16, 1999) (only 11 percent of surveyed said they followed reports of the
antitrust trial against Microsoft), http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=253.
23
Jay Greene, Microsoft Oversight Ends With Little to Show for Effort, CNET, May 12,
2011, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10805_3-20062079-75.html#ixzz1RFoy76X9; Robert H.
Lande & Norman W. Hawker, As Antitrust Case Ends, Microsoft is Victorious in Defeat,
BALTIMORE SUN, May 16, 2011.
24
Hofstadter, supra note 4, at 189.
25
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, tbl. 5.41.2010 (2010),
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t5412010.csv.
22

Private Antitrust Cases
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008

0

26
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227 of the Sherman Act has declined.
Within the U.S. legal academy, antitrust’s significance has diminished.
The number of law journal articles that mention antitrust, the Sherman Act,
or the Clayton Act steadily increased after the 1930s, peaked between 198084 (when the Reagan administration embraced the Chicago School
paradigm), and steadily declined thereafter.28 The same trend appears in the

Section 1 Investigations
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0

Source: U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Workload Statistics,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2011). The
number does not include FTC investigations or capture the DOJ investigation’s success or
impact. Kenneth M. Davidson, AAI Senior Fellow, Commentary: Numerology and the
Mismeasurement
of
Competition
Laws
(Sept.
29
2008),
www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/11012 (critiquing reliance on antitrust enforcement
statistics).
27
Antitrust Division Workload Statistics, supra note 26.
80
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frequency of books published since the 1930s that mention antitrust,
antitrust 29 the

Journal Articles
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Source:
Citations
in
Heinonline,
Most
Most-Cited
Cited
Law
Journals
database,
http://home.heinonline.org
http://home.heinonline.org.. Most of these journals existed since the 1930s. Two caveats:
(i) antitrust articles could appear more frequently in specialty and other law journals; and
(ii) the number of articles does not necessarily equate with the articles’ significance.
29
A
search
of
books
on
Google
Books
Ngram
Viewer
(http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/info
.com/info), which “displays
displays a graph showing how those phrases
have occurred in a corpus of books
books” between 1930 and 2008 for all English books, shows a
similar trend for the term antitrust, with an earlier peak for the number of books mentioning
the Sherman Act and Clayton Act:

In contrast, the term law has seen a more modest decline over the same period:
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After a string of Supreme Court

defeats for antitrust plaintiffs, the cover of the ABA’s fall 2007 ANTITRUST
magazine asked The End of Antitrust As We Know It? One antitrust lawyer
wrote,
The rhetoric and, arguably, the enforcement records of the
agencies—outside the cartel area—are less activist now than at any
time in recent years. No one would seriously suggest that we are
witnessing the end of antitrust. But is it the end of antitrust as we
once knew it, at least in the United States? If so, how should we
feel about it?31
What explains this anomaly? Why is antitrust growing internationally,
yet declining domestically? There are two important factors. The first is
salience, especially the salience of the U.S. antitrust’s goals. U.S. antitrust
policy has roughly twenty to thirty year-long cycles: (i) after initial
dormancy, 1900—1920, the promise of antitrust; (ii) 1920s—mid-1930s,
antitrust dormancy in the boom and bust years; (iii) mid-1940s—1970s,
antitrust representing “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” in preserving
economic and political freedom; and (iv) late-1970s—2010, antitrust’s
contraction under the Chicago and post-Chicago Schools’ neoclassical
economic theories.32 In the last cycle, some enforcers viewed antitrust’s

30

A similar trend exists for the terms FTC and DOJ’s Antitrust Division:

Google Books Ngram Viewer, http://ngrams.googlelabs.com.
31
Mark D. Whitener, Editor’s Note: The End of Antitrust? ANTITRUST 5 (Fall 2007).
32
Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust 2025, CPI ANTITRUST J. (Dec. 2010), available at
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more salient political, social, and moral goals as diluting antitrust principles.
Along with antitrust’s non-economic goals went its historic concern about
arresting economic power in its incipiency.
A second factor is that antitrust policy during the past policy cycle
relied on an incomplete, distorted conception of competition. Adopting the
Chicago School’s simplifying assumptions of self-correcting markets
composed of rational, self-interested market participants, courts and
enforcers sacrificed important political, social, and moral values to promote
certain economic beliefs. They accepted the increased risks from
concentrated telecommunications,33 financial,34 and radio35 industries,
among others, for the prospect of future efficiencies and innovation.36 They
ignored an important antitrust concern, namely the Bailout Dilemma.37
With the anger over taxpayer bailouts for firms deemed too-big-andintegral-to-fail, the wealth inequality that accelerated during the last policy
cycle,38 and the current budget cuts and austerity measures, the United
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1727251.
33
TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES
(2010).
34
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 12, 203 (2010); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons for
Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the
“Too-Big-To-Fail” Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 291 (2011).
35
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity for the Media
is a Bad Idea, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 115 (2010).
36
Mercury News Wire Services, Bigness Is Not Bad White House and Greenspan
Defend Mergers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 17, 1998, available at 1998 WLNR
1705551.
37
Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of
Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 268-69 (1995) (“economic power’s capacity
to obtain government bailouts—regardless of how incompetent, inefficient, and
unprogressive those who wield it may be—as the ultimate perversion of private
enterprise”).
38
G. William Domhoff, Power in America, Wealth, Income, and Power (Sept. 2005 &
updated Apr. 2010), http://sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (“As of
2007, the top 1% of households (the upper class) owned 34.6% of all privately held wealth,
and the next 19% (the managerial, professional, and small business stratum) had 50.5%,
which means that just 20% of the people owned a remarkable 85%, leaving only 15% of
the wealth for the bottom 80% (wage and salary workers”)).
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States is ripe for a new antitrust policy cycle. If so, what will drive it?
Two issues drove past cycles and will likely drive the next one: What is
competition, and what are the goals of competition law?

Only after

policymakers reconsider what is competition39 and the goals of competition
law, can they answer the third question, what should be the legal standards
and rules to promote these goals.

Accordingly, this article calls for

policymakers to reconsider antitrust’s goals.
Part I summarizes the shift during the last policy cycle from embracing
multiple political, social, moral, and economic goals to the current debate
over a single economic goal. Part II discusses why four oft-cited economic
goals (ensuring an effective competitive process, promoting consumer
welfare, maximizing efficiency, and ensuring economic freedom) failed to
unify antitrust analysis. Part III discusses why it is unrealistic to believe
that a single well-defined antitrust objective exists. Part IV proposes how to
account antitrust’s multiple policy objectives into the legal framework. It
outlines a blended goal approach, the risks of this approach, and its benefits
in providing better legal standards and reviving antitrust’s salience.
I. ANTITRUST’S GOALS
A. Importance in Defining Antitrust’s Objectives
The battle over antitrust begins with its goals. As the Chicago School
recognized, defining the goals of antitrust is paramount: “Everything else
follows from the answer we give.”40 Defining antitrust’s objectives serves
several important purposes.
First, the antitrust objectives inform the law’s enforcement and

39

Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Competition, MISS. L.J. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646151 (showing how no satisfactory
comprehensive definition of competition exists, and how varying one premise of
competition--the relative rationality of market firms and consumers–yields different
conceptions of competition).
40
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50
(1978).
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application.41 The objectives can shape enforcement policy and priorities.
They can inform policymakers of any gaps between actual outcomes from
current enforcement and desired outcomes. They can assist the courts in
applying the antitrust legal standards to assure that the result is aligned with
the objectives.
Second, to the extent measurable and transparent, the objectives can
increase the accountability of government antitrust enforcers, “increase
transparency and facilitate reasoned debate to the extent that they make
explicit the rationales for decisions in individual cases.”42
Finally, in any jurisdiction with multiple enforcers (such as federal and
state antitrust agencies in the U.S.), defining objectives ensures that the
antitrust enforcers (and other law enforcement officials) are not thwarting
each other’s efforts. One agency can increase enforcement when another is
lax, but all the enforcement is directed toward consistent objectives.43
B. Antitrust’s Historical Goals
With the Supreme Court’s gloss, Section One of the Sherman Act
punishes “unreasonable” restraints of trade.44 Section Two of the Sherman
Act prohibits a company to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . .
trade or commerce.”45 Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and
acquisitions when the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.”46 Unlike other countries’ antitrust statutes,47

41

AM. BAR ASS’N, SEC. OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY
OBJECTIVES
(2003),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/atcomments/2003/reports/policyobjectives.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST GOALS].
42
Id.
43
LUDWIG VON MISES, BUREAUCRACY 70 (2007).
44
15 U.S.C. § 1.
45
15 U.S.C. § 2.
46
15 U.S.C. § 18.
47
See, e.g., Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. I (adopted
Aug. 30, 2007) (law enacted “for the purpose of preventing and restraining monopolistic
conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing economic efficiency,
safeguarding the interests of consumers and social public interest, promoting the healthy
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the U.S. antitrust laws do not identify specific objectives.

An

“unreasonable” restraint ultimately reflects a normative judgment of what is
unreasonable.
Nor does the legislative history identify a single objective.48 Hofstadter,
for example, categorized antitrust’s goals as (i) economic (competition
maximizes “economic efficiency”), (ii) political (antitrust principles
“intended to block private accumulations of power and protect democratic
government”), and (iii) social and moral (competitive process was
“disciplinary machinery” for character development).49
The political, social, and moral goals were salient after World War II
given the cartels in Nazi Germany colluding with U.S. firms.50 Congress, in
passing section 7 of the Clayton Act and in its 1950 Celler-Kefauver AntiMerger amendment, “was concerned with arresting concentration in the

development of the socialist market economy”); Netherlands Competition Auth.,
Competition Enforcement and Consumer Welfare Setting the Agenda 14 (2011),
www.atp.nl/nma/image.php?id=146&type=pdf [hereinafter 2011 ICN Survey].
48
Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency,
What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1977).
49
HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 199-200; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 412 (2005) (discussing how the direct election of U.S.
senators was to counter the “undue effects of large corporations, monopolies, trusts, and
other special interest groups in the Senate election process”); Frank Maier-Rigaud, On the
Normative Foundations of Competition Law: Efficiency, Political Freedom and the
Freedom to Compete (May 2, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1829023;
Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the
Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and Behavioral
Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469, 503-4 (2011).
50
F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXT AND DOCUMENTS--THE DEFINITIVE
EDITION 187-92 (2007); WENDELL BERGE, CARTELS: CHALLENGE TO A FREE WORLD
(1944); Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REV. 497; Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress Transmitting
Recommendations Relative to the Strengthening and Enforcement of Antitrust Laws, Apr.
29. 1938, S. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938), reprinted in I.iv THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 3404
(Earl W. Kintner ed. 1978) (“liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the
growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state
itself”).
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American economy, whatever its cause, in its incipiency.”51 Congress’ fear
was “not only of accelerated concentration of economic power on economic
grounds, but also of the threat to other values a trend toward concentration
was thought to pose.”52
In reviewing the Sherman Act’s legislative history, the Court noted
Congress’s non-economic concerns about the concentration of wealth and
power in the hands of the few.53 The Sherman Act, found the Court, sought
to

51

•

prevent the concentration of markets through acquisitions,54 and
“perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of
possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which
can effectively compete with each other;”55

•

protect firms’ “right of freedom to trade;”56

•

promote consumer welfare, allocative efficiency and price
competition;57

United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551 (1966).
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962); H.R. REP. NO. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (prohibiting relationships that deprive rivals a fair opportunity to
compete); KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALITY IGNORED: HOW MILTON FRIEDMAN AND
CHICAGO ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 9 (2011).
53
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
54
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 374.
55
Id.; see also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966) (“[l]ike
the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914, the basic purpose of the 1950
Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the American economy by
keeping a large number of small competitors in business”); United States v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (“possible, because of its indirect social or moral
effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own
skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the
direction of a few”).
56
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
57
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993)
(“antitrust laws’ traditional concern for consumer welfare and price competition”); Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984)
(“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription’”) (quoting
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)) (quoting BORK, supra note 40);
Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) (“assure customers the benefits of price competition”);
52
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•

“protect the public from the failure of the market;”58

•

preserve economic freedom59 and the freedom for each business
“to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and
ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster;”60

•

condemn practices that “completely shut[] out competitors, not
only from trade in which they are already engaged, but from the
opportunities to build up trade in any community where these
great and powerful combinations are operating under this system
and practice;”61

•

“secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public against
evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade;”62 and

•

“be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”63

While concerned of higher prices and less initiative from monopolies,

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (“primary goal of
antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare by promoting competition among firms);
L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Antitrust law is
designed to protect consumers from the higher prices-and society from the reduction in
allocative efficiency-that occurs when firms with market power curtail output.”); Rebel Oil
Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1445 (9th Cir. 1995) (characterizing allocative
efficiency as synonymous with consumer welfare and as “the central goal of the Sherman
Act”); J. Allen Ramey, M.D., Inc. v. Pac. Found. For Med. Care, 999 F. Supp. 1355, 1364
(S.D. Cal. 1998); Ginzburg v. Mem’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (S.D.
Tex. 1997) (“purpose of antitrust law is the promotion of consumer welfare”) (quoting
Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, 899 F.2d 951, 960 (10th Cir.1990)).
58
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
59
Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 538; Kochert v. Greater Lafayette
Health Services, Inc., 463 F.3d 710, 715 (7th Cir. 2006); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003); SigmaPharm, Inc. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 772 F.
Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
60
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
61
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10 n.15 (1984) (quoting
H.R.Rep. No. 63-627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1914)).
62
Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of U.S. & Canada, 260 U.S. 501,
512 (1923).
63
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
104 n. 27 (1984) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958)).
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courts also expressed social and political concerns of monopolies, including
impoverishing individuals of their livelihood.64 Even if monopolies were
beneficent, opportunity, and liberty remain limited.65
C. The Quest for a Single Antitrust Goal
Although economists were ambivalent when the Sherman Act was
enacted,66 and even though the Act’s legislative history encompassed noneconomic concerns,67 in the past policy cycle, Richard Posner, Robert Bork
64

United States v. Vandebrake, CR10-4025-MWB, 2011 WL 488690 (N.D. Iowa Feb.
8, 2011) (quoting United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (“Industrial power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many
hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the
political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men. The fact that they
are not vicious men but respectable and social minded is irrelevant. That is the philosophy
and the command of the Sherman Act.”); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 274 (1966) (“From this country’s beginning there has been an abiding and widespread
fear of the evils which flow from monopoly—that is the concentration of economic power
in the hands of a few.”); United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553–54
(1944) (“‘Trusts’ and ‘monopolies’ were the terror of the period. Their power to fix prices,
to restrict production, to crush small independent traders, and to concentrate large power in
the few to the detriment of the many, were but some of numerous evils ascribed to them.”);
Bepex Corp. v. Black Clawson Co., 713 F.2d 202, 204 (6th Cir. 1983) (“One freedom
which the colonists sought in 1776 was freedom from monopolies.”); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (Congress not necessarily
actuated by economic motives alone and concerned about monopolies’ indirect social and
moral effect); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898)
(Monopolies “deprive the public of the services of men in the employments and capacities
in which they may be most useful to the community as well as themselves.”) (quoting
Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. 51, 54 (1837)); see also Case of Monopolies, (1602) 77 Eng.
Rep. 1260, 1263 (K.B.) (if monopolies flourish, workers, who maintained for their
families, “will of necessity be constrained to live in idleness and beggary”); Mitchel v.
Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (Ch.) (deprives public of useful member).
65
See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 421 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“The basic economic policy of the Nation is one favoring competitive
markets in which individual entrepreneurs are free to make their own decisions concerning
price and output.”).
66
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 58 (4th ed. 2011) (concepts of allocative efficiency and
deadweight loss “were almost certainly not known to the framers of the Sherman Act”);
George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3
(1982) (“A careful student of the history of economics would have searched long and hard,
on July 2 of 1890, the day the Sherman Act was signed by President Harrison, for any
economist who had ever recommended the policy of actively combatting collusion or
monopolization in the economy at large.”).
67
For further discussion of the Sherman Act’s legislative history, including Judge
Bork’s interpretation and the criticisms thereto, see generally Daniel R. Ernst, The New
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and other Chicago School scholars pursued a quest for a single unifying
economic goal.68

Antitrust’s whole task was “the effort to improve

allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as
to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.”69
Their economic goal was consistent with their largely static conception
of competition, strong belief in the rationality of market participants,
skepticism over the likelihood and extent of market failures, and doubts of
the government’s institutional capacities.70

With their faith in lightly

regulated markets, they saw a limited role for antitrust, and accordingly
marginalized antitrust’s political, moral, and social goals.71 By the early
2000s, Posner surmised that
[a]lmost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today-whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed
observer--not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws
should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees on the
essential tenets of economic theory that should be used to determine
the consistency of specific business practices with that goal.72
Despite Posner’s assertion, the U.S. antitrust community never agreed
that antitrust’s goals were only economic or that antitrust had one goal, to
promote economic welfare.73

Others continued to recognize antitrust’s

Antitrust History, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 879, 882-83 (1990); Robert H. Lande, Wealth
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 889-94 (1999).
68
Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1982) (collecting articles that antitrust’s overriding goal is economic efficiency).
69
BORK, supra note 40, at 91; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW viii-ix
(2d ed. 2001).
70
HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, at 71-73 (summarizing Chicago School’s theories);
Adams & Brock, supra note 37, at 282-93 (same).
71
Markham, supra note 34, at 280.
72
POSNER, supra note 69, at ix; see also Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States,
704 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (“The allocative-efficiency or consumerwelfare concept of competition dominates current thinking, judicial and academic, in the
antitrust field.”).
73
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
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multiple objectives.74 Professors Adams and Brock, for example, identified
among antitrust’s traditional aims: (i) private economic power, like all
absolute power, is subject to abuse and injurious to public welfare, (ii) such
power must be decentralized to protect a free society from its abuse, (iii)
competitively structured markets diffuse private power and discipline
economic decision-making, and (iv) antitrust policy is critical to preserve
competitive markets.75 While the FTC chair during the Clinton
administration, Professor Robert Pitofsky referred to antitrust’s noneconomic goals.76 As he earlier wrote, “[i]t is bad history, bad policy, and
bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws,”
and any antitrust policy that excluded such political values “would be
unresponsive to the will of Congress.”77
Nor did antitrust lawyers ever agree that antitrust’s sole goal is
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 56 (Robert Pitofsky ed. 2008) (noting disagreement within
antitrust community over “whether economic efficiency should be the sole norm in
antitrust or whether efficiency should be balanced against other norms such as consumer
welfare and/or the promotion of small business”).
74
See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 52, at 37; Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail: The Role
of Antitrust to Distressed Industries, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 281-96 (2010); Spencer
Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust and Beyond, 32 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 113, 117 (2000); Eleanor Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New
Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1182 (1981) (identifying Sherman Act’s four
major historical goals as “(1) dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and opportunity
to compete on merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of competition
process as market governor”).
75
Adams & Brock, supra note 37, at 262-79; see also JOSEPH W. BURNS, A STUDY OF
THE ANTITRUST LAW: THEIR ADMINISTRATION, INTERPRETATION AND EFFECT 341 (1958)
(“Concern over excessive growth of private economic power and its social and political
implications is built into every member of the structure of antitrust policy, including
section 7.”); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust
Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965).
76
Robert Pitofsky, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at
the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property (June 15, 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/000615speech.shtm.
77
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 105152 (1979) (one political value underlying the Sherman Act was a “fear that excessive
concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures”); William
E. Kovacic, ICN Curriculum Project, Module 1: Origins and Aims of Competition Policy
(May 2011), http://www.icnblog.org/ftc/ftc-1-module-4-28-11/player.html (discussing
Sherman Act’s political and economic objectives).
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promoting Posner’s conception of economic welfare.78 For example, two
years after Posner’s assertion, the ABA discussed antitrust’s social and
political objectives.79
While unsuccessful with Congress,80 the Chicago School influenced the
Reagan81 and Bush82 administrations and courts.83

The debate over

antitrust’s goals shifted, although not completely,84 to the economic
78

See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sherman Act Section 2 Joint
Hearing: Understanding Single-Firm Behavior--Conduct As Related To Competition (May
8, 2007), www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/225233.wpd-2007-08-29-,
(Statement of Douglas Melamed) (characterizing hearings as an “unbounded exercise for a
public policy class at the Kennedy School” with the different views stemming from
differences in assumptions about antitrust’s purpose).
79
ABA, ANTITRUST GOALS, supra note 41.
80
Anna Cifelli Isgro, Antitrust Reform: DOA Reagan’s Plan Rankles Business
Lobbies, Consumer Groups, and Congressman Rodino, FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 1986,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1986/03/31/67320/index.htm.
81
As now Chief Justice John Roberts said at the time, the Reagan administration’s
“antitrust enforcement activities parallel our general concern with excessive regulation.”
http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0372/ doc004.pdf; William F.
Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman’s View, 71 CAL. L. REV. 618, 630
(1983) (announcing that DOJ “will consider only those factors that, according to economic
theory or empirical evidence, relate to the ease and profitability of collusion. An industry
trend toward concentration is not a factor that will be considered, even though it has been
used in the past.”).
82
Competition officials during the last Bush administration stated that the “promotion
of consumer welfare and the organization of the free market economy are the only goals of
its antitrust laws . . . with other economic or social objectives better pursued by other
instruments.” Unilateral Conduct Working Grp., Int’l Competition Network, Report on the
Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market
Power,
and
State-Created
Monopolies
31
(2007),
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf [hereinafter
2007 ICN Report].
83
Markham, supra note 34, at 264-65 (“Beginning with Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., the antitrust laws in the United States began a steady process of judicial
erosion to eliminate multiple and possibly conflicting policy objectives, distilling in their
place the exclusive purpose of promoting consumer welfare through allocative and
dynamic efficiency.”).
84
See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing that “Court, in its haste to excuse illegal behavior in the
name of efficiency, has cast aside a century of understanding that our antitrust laws are
designed to safeguard more than efficiency and consumer welfare, and that private actions
not only compensate the injured, but also deter wrongdoers.”); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324
F.3d 141, 169 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing Section 2’s goal, to curb the excesses of
monopolists and near-monopolists, as “the equivalent in our economic sphere of the
guarantees of free and unhampered elections in the political sphere. Just as democracy can
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The primary policy debate was whether to apply a total or

consumer welfare standard.86 Likewise, in the past policy cycle, the Court
acknowledged antitrust’s economic goals, but not its political, social and
moral goals.87 For example, the Court recently praised monopoly prices as
an inducement for innovation.88 One district court, following the Court’s
dictum, went further afield in announcing, “the purpose of antitrust laws is
not to prevent monopolies.”89 This, of course, is squarely inconsistent with
the Clayton Act, which prohibits practices and mergers “that tend to create a

thrive only in a free political system unhindered by outside forces, so also can market
capitalism survive only if those with market power are kept in check.”); MCI Commc’ns
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1176 (7th Cir. 1983) (Wood, C.J., concurring
& dissenting in part) (“While efficiency and consumer welfare are laudable goals, they
should not be permitted to entirely eclipse a major aim of the antitrust laws: the promotion
of competition. To advance efficiency ahead of competition in the hierarchy of antitrust
values is to slight the non-economic dimension of the Sherman Act’s concern with
competition.”).
85
Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite
Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1062 (2003) (noting in the past generation courts have
emphasized economic efficiencies to the exclusion of noneconomic objectives); Rudolph
J.R. Peritz, Foreword, Antitrust as Public Interest Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 77172 (1991) (traditional goals such as “the abatement of unfair competition, a strong
preference for individual entrepreneurs, the disfavor of monopoly profits, a distrust of firms
with great economic power, and a recognition of competition as a process with social,
economic, and political returns” were “shoved into the archives of antitrust history”).
86
See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191,
208 (2008) (arguing that Congress’s overriding concern was with protecting purchasers
from paying supracompetitive prices, and antitrust policy can and should take business
welfare into account in those few situations that help businesses but do not cause
consumers to pay supracompetitive prices); Dennis W. Carlton, Econ. Analysis Grp.
Discussion Paper, Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?, EAG 07-3 (Jan. 2007),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/221242.htm (describing the debate as maximizing
consumer surplus, total surplus (total welfare), or some weighted average of producer plus
consumer surplus, and arguing that the proper objective of antitrust should be total, not
consumer, surplus); Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for
Antitrust Enforcement, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 205, 206 (2007) (discussing debate
among senior DOJ’s Antitrust Division economists over a total versus consumer surplus
standard).
87
See supra note 57.
88
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
89
Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL, 742 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2010) motion to
certify appeal denied, 09-CV-65, 2011 WL 1305219 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 1, 2011).
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monopoly.”90

But it shows how far some courts have strayed from

antitrust’s historical goals.
D. ICN Members’ Multiple Goals
While the U.S. during the past policy cycle sought a single economic
goal for antitrust, elsewhere more countries were enacting competition laws,
with more antitrust objectives as a result. The ICN recently completed three
surveys of its member competition authorities to identify their countries’
antitrust objectives. As the ICN found, the “objectives of competition laws
vary widely from one jurisdiction to another. . . . [P]arallel objectives,
possibly conflicting with that of economic efficiency or consumer welfare,
are present in many competition laws.”91
The ICN in its first survey asked about the countries’ objectives
regarding laws prohibiting monopolistic behavior. Ten objectives emerged:
• Ensuring an effective competitive process,
• Promoting consumer welfare,
• Enhancing efficiency,
• Ensuring economic freedom,
• Ensuring a level playing field for small and mid-sized enterprises,
• Promoting fairness and equality,
• Promoting consumer choice,
• Achieving market integration,
• Facilitating privatization and market liberalization, and
• Promoting competitiveness in international markets.92
In the second survey of 33 jurisdictions, the main antitrust objectives
were the promotion of competition, economic efficiency, and increasing
90

15 U.S.C. §§ 13-14, 18.
Advocacy Working Grp., Int’l Competition Network, Advocacy and Competition
Policy
Report
32
(2002),
http://
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/OutreachToolkit/media/assets/resources/advoca
cy_ report.pdf [hereinafter ICN Advocacy Report].
92
2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at annex A.
91
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consumer welfare.93 Included within these terms were other goals such as
guaranteeing “equal conditions for all enterprises in the market.”94
The third survey in 2011 explored 57 countries’ conception and
application of one oft-cited goal, promoting consumer welfare.95
Consequently, the reality facing international firms today is various
policy goals.

Antitrust goals that prevail in one jurisdiction are not

necessarily as important in other jurisdictions.
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT GOALS TO UNIFY ANTITRUST POLICY
As Part I discusses, U.S. antitrust policy in the United States historically
recognized multiple goals. In the last policy cycle, however, some sought
to limit antitrust to a single economic goal. This Part examines why four
oft-cited economic goals neither unified antitrust policy nor significantly
improved antitrust analysis.96
A. Why Ensuring an Effective Competitive Process Never Unified Antitrust
Policy
The U.S. courts have remarked that the “purpose of antitrust law, at
least as articulated in the modern cases, is to protect the competitive
process.”97 Similarly all but one of the competition agencies surveyed by
the ICN cited “[e]nsuring an effective competitive process” as an objective
of the monopolization laws.98 Presumably, no one advocates an
“ineffective” competitive process.
This goal fails, as it simply shifts the debate to the larger, unresolved
93

Turkish Competition Auth., International Competition Network Report on Interface
between Competition Policy and Other Public Policies 44 (Apr. 2010), http://www.icnistanbul.org/Upload/Materials/SpecialProject/SP_BackgroundReport.pdf.
94
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 7 (identifying one of Barbados’s primary
objectives).
95
Id.
96
Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV. 59, 6061 (2010); Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17, at 1421-73.
97
Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 (7th Cir.1986); see also Tal v.
Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc.,
36 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994) (same).
98
2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 6.
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issue, namely defining an “effective competitive process.”99 No consensus
exists in the United States or worldwide on an effective competition process
or on a unifying theory of competition.100 Antitrust becomes a tautology.
The goal of competition law is “promoting competition by discouraging
anti-competitive behaviour.”101
What constitutes an effective competitive process varies by audience.102
Among the goals cited by the ICN-surveyed agencies were protecting
consumers,103 encouraging creativity in business activities,104 achieving
efficiency and fairness to small and medium-sized enterprises,105 and
safeguarding jobs.106 Entrenched firms may emphasize promoting their
freedom to contract, choose their distributors or retailers, and not deal with
their competitors. Domestic competitors may advocate protecting choice
for consumers to insulate themselves from more efficient international
competitors.107

99

Entrepreneurs may emphasize greater access to the

Id. at 8 (noting Chilean Competition Tribunal’s response “that while the only
objective of competition policy is to promote and protect competition, one of the main
difficulties is to define legally what ‘free competition means,’ or to articulate why
competition itself should be protected”).
100
Stucke, Reconsidering Competition, supra note 39 (discussing how any theory of
competition depends on its assumptions, the validity of which can vary across industries
and time); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Policy Brief: What Is Competition on the
Merits? 1 (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/27/37082099.pdf (noting term
“competition on the merits” has “never been satisfactorily defined,” which has “led to a
discordant body of case law that uses an assortment of analytical methods,” which in turn
has “produced unpredictable results and undermined the term’s legitimacy along with
policies that are supposedly based on it”).
101
CUTS Centre for Competition, Inv. & Econ. Regulation, Towards a Healthy
Competition Culture... i (2003), http://www.cuts-international.org/THC.pdf [hereinafter
CUTS].
102
Id.
103
2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 7.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
For example, certain developing nations noted that transnational companies “enjoy
advantages over domestic firms because of their size, reach and control over intellectual
property (technologies, brands, copyright etc).” CUTS, supra note 101, at 17. One
necessity of competition policy, as envisioned by CUTS, is “to prevent these firms from

11-Aug-11]

RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS

23

marketplace. Consumers may want it all: lower prices, greater choices,
better quality, more innovation, while preserving their jobs and pay
structure at domestic firms.
Nor can policymakers define an “effective competitive process” by the
desired effects, such as lower costs and prices, improved quality and
services, greater choice, and more innovation. The desired competitive
effects can conflict. The Court, for example, stresses the importance of
price competition.108 Yet the Court recently accepted higher prices (and
diminished intra-brand competition) for more services (and potentially more
inter-brand competition).109

Higher prices at times are needed for

innovation.110
Accordingly, the objective of an effective competitive process is simply

unfairly exploiting these advantages.” Id.
108
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
107-08 (1984) (restraint “that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer
preference in setting price and output is not consistent with this fundamental goal of
antitrust law” and restrictions on “price and output are the paradigmatic examples of
restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit”); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v.
linkLine Communc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 (2009) (“Low prices
benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above
predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.”) (quotation omitted); see also Cascade
Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 896 (9th Cir. 2008) (“price cutting is a
practice the antitrust laws aim to promote”); Wallace v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 467
F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 2006) (“goal of antitrust law is to use rivalry to keep prices low
for consumers’ benefit. Employing antitrust law to drive prices up would turn the Sherman
Act on its head.”); Animal Sci. Products, Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. &
Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320, 465 (D.N.J. 2010) (“goal of antitrust law is to create the
maximum market competition between the sellers of the same goods and, hence, to drive
the price on these goods as much down as possible”).
109
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895-96 (2007);
Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Higher prices
alone are not the ‘epitome’ of anticompetitive harm . . . Rather, consumer welfare,
understood in the sense of allocative efficiency, is the animating concern of the Sherman
Act.”).
110
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215-16 (2003) (need to balance encouraging
innovation by rewarding inventors with the right to exclude others for a limited time from
using the patented invention with the “avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition
without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”).
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a belief in other objectives, which can conflict.111
B. Why Consumer Welfare Never Unified Antitrust Policy
In the past antitrust policy cycle, the U.S. courts increasingly identified
consumer welfare as a historic antitrust concern.112 The irony is that before
1975, the Court never mentioned “consumer welfare” in an antitrust case.113
Despite its pleasant democratic ring (who, after all, advocates hindering
consumer welfare?), it too suffers infirmities.
1. No Consensus Exists on What Consumer Welfare Actually Means
In 1987, Professor Joseph Brodley remarked that the terms efficiency
and consumer welfare “have become the dominant terms of antitrust
discourse without any clear consensus as to what they exactly mean” and
that consumer welfare “is the most abused term in modern analysis.”114
That remains true today.115
111

CUTS, supra note 101, at i.
See supra note 87.
113
United States v. Citizens & S. Nat. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 132 n.1 (1975)
(“Correspondent banking, like other intra-industry interaction among firms or their top
management, provides an opportunity both for the kind of education and sharing of
expertise that ultimately enhances consumer welfare and for ‘understandings’ that inhibit,
if not foreclose, the rivalry that antitrust laws seek to promote.”). The term consumer
welfare appeared more frequently in books during the past antitrust policy cycle:
112

Google Books Ngram Viewer, http://ngrams.googlelabs.com.
114
Joseph Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare,
and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1032 (1987).
115
HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, at 85 (noting term’s ambiguity); Barak Y. Orbach, The
Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox 2, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 134 (2011)
(“academic confusion and thoughtless judicial borrowing led to the rise of a label
[consumer welfare] that thirty years later has no clear meaning”); Steven C. Salop,
Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True
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Although thirty of thirty-three countries in the 2007 ICN survey
identified this objective, most did “not specifically define consumer welfare
and appear[ed] to have different economic understandings of the term.”116
Similarly the 2011 survey, while finding “some agreement” among the
surveyed 57 competition authorities, identified significant differences.117
Only 7 of the 57 agreed with the provided definition of consumer
welfare.118

Most (38 of the 57) antitrust authorities had “no explicit

definition” of consumer welfare.119 Some considered consumer welfare as
“a natural result of enforcement activities but not necessarily an underlying
goal.”120

Under this definition, antitrust enforcers promote consumer

welfare whenever they act (or not act). Others defined consumer welfare
broadly to include “safeguarding the competitive process,” which in turn
encompasses both price and non-price dimensions.121

France included

“enhancing the competitive process . . . stimulating an efficient allocation of
resources and preventing unchecked market power” within its conception of
promoting consumer welfare over the long-term.122
Not only do competition authorities disagree over the term’s meaning.
The U.S. Antitrust Modernization Commissioners, after three years, could

Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 347 (2010) (noting
confusion over meaning of aggregate and consumer welfare standards); J. Thomas Rosch,
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Next Challenges for Antitrust Economists, Remarks at
the NERA 2010 Antitrust & Trade Regulation Seminar (July 8, 2010) (noting many
different
ideas
exist
as
to
how
to
promote
consumer
welfare),
www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100708neraspeech.pdf.
116
2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 9.
117
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 4-6.
118
Id. at 18 nn. 34-35 (consumer welfare “relates only to consumer surplus” and
excludes “non-economic considerations”).
119
Id. at 18-19.
120
Id. at 10.
121
Compare id. at 10 with id. at 11, 12 (countries separately identifying other goals,
such as maintaining effective competition, as distinct from consumer welfare).
122
Id. at 10; Elzinga, supra note 48, at 1193 (discussing how efficiency and equity
were not mutually exclusive, and included the distribution of income).
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not reach unanimity on the term.123 The Commissioners issued in 2007
their 449-page report on how “antitrust law and enforcement can best serve
consumer welfare in the global, high-tech economy that exists today.”124
But the debate before and within the AMC was “about the precise definition
of ‘consumer welfare.”’125 The “[d]ebate continues over whether the
Supreme Court implicitly adopted the goal of allocative efficiency or the
goal of preventing wealth transfers as the standard by which consumer
welfare should be measured.”126
Consequently, consumer welfare means different things to different
people. As the economist F.A. Hayek observed, the welfare of a people
“cannot be adequately expressed as a single end, but only as a hierarchy of
ends, a comprehensive scale of values in which every need of every person
is given its place.”127 Consumer welfare is not a well-defined goal but a
generality that incorporates different social, political, economic, and moral
values. Bork’s definition of consumer welfare differs from other scholars’
definitions.128 For Judge Wald and others, the phrase consumer welfare
“surely includes far more than simple economic efficiency.”129 Professors
Sullivan and Grimes discuss within the definition of consumer welfare
maintaining allocative efficiency, preventing wealth transfers, and
123

The Antitrust Modernization Commission was created pursuant to the Antitrust
Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 11051-60, 116 Stat.
1856.
124
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2007),
available
at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf
[hereinafter AMC REPORT].
125
Id. at 26 n.22.
126
Id. at 43 n.19.
127
HAYEK, supra note 50, at 101.
128
Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. &
ECON. 7, 7-48 (1966); Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 67, at 65-151; Robert H.
Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers (not
Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 963-66 (1999).
129
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 231 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Wald, J., concurring).
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preserving consumer choice.130 Not surprisingly, courts have reached
inconsistent results, based on their conception of consumer welfare.131
2. Difficulty in Identifying the Consumer
If antitrust’s goal is promoting consumer welfare, another dispute is
defining the consumer. If the consumer is anyone who uses economic
goods,132 or “refers to all direct and indirect users who are affected by the
anticompetitive agreements, behavior or mergers in question,”133 then
everyone—from the poorest individual to the wealthiest corporate
monopoly--is a consumer. The consumer welfare standard becomes a total
welfare standard, which raises separate concerns over the distribution of
wealth.134 If the consumer includes poor individuals but excludes wealthy
monopolies (and other corporate purchasers of goods and services), then the
definition becomes more political and subjective.135
3. Operational Difficulties
Some U.S. courts say that the “reduction of competition does not invoke
the Sherman Act until it harms consumer welfare.”136 This is nonsense.
130

LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 12-16 (2d ed. 2006).
131
Compare Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1033-34 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (antitrust laws are concerned with consumer welfare and not with competitors
seeking to obtain monopoly) with Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 536 (7th Cir.
1986) (Sherman Act protects rivalry to obtain monopoly).
132
WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 242 (1979) (defining consumer).
133
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 32.
134
Id. at 27.
135
Id. at 32; Carlton, supra note 86 (“if only consumers matter, then a buying cartel
should be perfectly legal and indeed should be encouraged” and “the notion that antitrust
should focus on consumers, not firms, is premised on a false vision of who are consumers
and who are firms. Most transactions in our economy are between firms.”).
136
Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Rebel
Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995)); Templin v. Times
Mirror Cable Television, Inc., 56 F.3d 73 (9th Cir. 1995); Ice Cream Distribs. of
Evansville, LLC v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 09-5815 CW, 2010 WL 3619884
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010); J. Allen Ramey, M.D., Inc. v. Pac. Found. For Med. Care, 999
F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., C062057JFRS, 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Streamcast Networks, Inc. v.
Skype Technologies, S.A., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Fox v. Good
Samaritan Hosp., C-04-00874RMW, 2007 WL 2938175 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2007); Perry v.
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Courts have not arrived at a shared, specific definition of consumer welfare.
Even if they did, courts cannot value, consistent with the rule of law, how
much competition can be reduced before harming consumer welfare.
One rule-of-law concern is that quantifying consumer welfare is itself
impracticable, if not impossible. Twenty-eight percent of the countries in
the 2011 ICN survey believed that quantifying consumer harm was “not
possible.”137 Of those who believed it possible to quantify detriment to
consumer welfare, they all recognized difficulties and limitations to such
quantification.138 Thus, requiring an antitrust plaintiff to show when a
reduction in competition harms consumer welfare is illogical when “no
easy, non-contestable, method for quantifying harm to consumer welfare”
currently exists.139
A second rule-of-law concern is the constraints on data availability to
undertake this review.

Suppose, for example, courts adopted as their

definition of consumer welfare “the individual benefits derived from the
consumption of goods and services.”140 Under this definition, “individual
welfare is defined by an individual’s own assessment of his/her satisfaction,
given prices and income;” accordingly, measuring consumer welfare
“requires information about individual preferences.”141
individual preferences is itself difficult.

Measuring

One cannot rely entirely on

consumers’ choices, as consumers at times choose poorly and contrary to
their long-term interests.142 Moreover, consumer welfare, if measured on
Rado, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047 (E.D. Wash. 2007), aff’d, 343 F. App’x. 240 (9th Cir.
2009).
137
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 40.
138
Id. at 41.
139
Id. at 88.
140
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GLOSSARY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANISATION
ECONOMICS
AND
COMPETITION
LAW
29
(1993),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf [hereinafter OECD GLOSSARY].
141
Id.
142
See, e.g., Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When
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the individual level, does not address restraints and mergers that increase
some consumers’ welfare, while decreasing others’.
Some economists adopt consumers’ surplus143 to measure consumer
welfare.144 But consumer surplus is seen as synonymous with static price
competition, which is of limited use in industries with dynamic
competition.145 Thus, the ICN surveyed countries generally did “not seem
to wish to be tied to a formal definition of consumer welfare as consumer
surplus, and certainly not if consumer surplus is given a narrow definition
and confined to price, without due consideration for quality, and other
economic criteria.”146 Plus, “there is considerable debate over the degree to
which [surplus] corresponds to more theoretically appealing measures of
consumer welfare.”147 Ultimately proving that consumers were harmed
often involves significant labor, time, and other costs and the data is not
always available.148
A third rule-of-law concern is predictability and objectivity. Taking the
mantra that the “antitrust law aims to protect competition, not competitors,”
courts begin their analysis of antitrust injury “from the viewpoint of the
consumer.”149 A “prototypical example of antitrust injury” is that

Choice Impairs Social Welfare, 25 J. PUBLIC POL’Y & MARKETING 24, 26 (2006).
143
Consumer surplus is the “excess of social valuation of product over the price
actually paid,” and “is measured by the area of a triangle below a demand curve and above
the observed price.” OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 28. Suppose for example, after
a long hike, you were willing to pay $2 for a cold Diet Coke. At the local store, you paid
50 cents. Your consumer surplus was $1.50. What consumers are willing to pay (and the
amount of consumer surplus) can fluctuate, such as the price one is willing to pay for an
umbrella.
144
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 18 (7 of the 57 survey countries).
145
Id. at 19.
146
Id. at 26.
147
OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 28; see also Orbach, supra note 115, at 2027.
148
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 45.
149
Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 641 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Alberta
Gas Chemicals, Ltd. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1240 (3d
Cir.1987)).
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consumers “had to pay higher prices (or experienced a reduction in the
quality of service) as a result of a defendant's anticompetitive conduct.”150
This standard is feasible when defendants illegally fixed the price of
consumer goods or services. But proving this kind of antitrust injury in
many other antitrust cases, such as when an entrenched firm eliminates a
start-up through exclusionary means, is harder.

Nor can an antitrust

plaintiff prove her consumer welfare was reduced; instead he “must prove
that the challenged conduct affected the prices, quantity or quality of goods
or services and not just his own welfare.”151 As a circuit court judge and his
co-author observed, it requires the antitrust plaintiff to engage in a
“speculative, possibly labyrinthine, and unnecessary” analysis of how the
restraints’ efficiencies and inefficiencies affect the ill-defined consumer.152
This analysis, as the ICN found, engenders “a relatively high degree of
uncertainty in estimations or assumptions used for quantification of
detriment to consumer welfare.”153
Some courts equate a reduction of consumer welfare with an increase in
price or reduction in quality.154 This, however, says nothing about other
important facets of competition (such as variety or innovation). One district
court under its narrow conception of consumer welfare, for example,
dismissed an antitrust complaint, in part because “reduced innovation as a
result of defendants’ conduct does not create an inference of raised
consumer prices or reduced output.”155 These courts cannot simply assume
150

Mathias v. Daily News, L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Ginzburg v. Mem’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1015 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
152
Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 96, at 87.
153
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 43.
154
Pool Water Products v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“Consumer welfare is maximized when economic resources are allocated to their best use
and when consumers are assured competitive price and quality.”) (quoting Rebel Oil Co. v.
Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995)).
155
Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL, 742 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1013 (E.D. Wis. 2010) motion
to certify appeal denied, 09-CV-65, 2011 WL 1305219 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 1, 2011).
151
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that because prices did not increase and output did not decrease as a result
of the restraint, consumer welfare was not diminished.156

One cannot

assume that generalist courts can determine “how much restraint of
competition is in the public interest”; such a “shifting, vague, and
indeterminate” standard would put courts into “sea of doubt.”157
Consequently, consumer welfare provides little guidance as an antitrust
goal. While some courts, particularly those in the Ninth Circuit, require a
showing that the restraint adversely impacts consumer welfare, this cannot
be taken literally. The “connection between consumer welfare and the
practical enforcement of competition law is not always straightforward,”
concluded the 2011 ICN survey; “there may be a considerable gap between
policy statements and practice.”158 Consumer welfare for some agencies
“provides general, underlying conceptual guidance rather than a technical
test for enforcement in practice.”159 Although consumer welfare over the
past thirty years is frequently mentioned as a policy goal, there remains no
consensus on what the term actually means or who the consumers are. Plus,
under any of the current definitions, there remains “no easy, noncontestable method for quantifying harm to consumer welfare that will
work for all cases.”160
C. Why Enhancing Efficiency Never Unified Antitrust Policy
Courts have cited enhancing efficiency as an antitrust goal.161 But the

156

2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 44.
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1898).
158
Id. at 3.
159
Id. at 19.
160
Id. at 45.
161
See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985) (whether to apply Court’s per se illegal rule turns on “whether the
practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output . . . or instead one designed to ‘increase economic
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive’”) (quoting Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)).
157
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legal status of efficiencies as antitrust’s primary goal is weaker.162
Although the Supreme Court has not sanctioned the use of the efficiencies
defense in merger cases, the trend among lower courts is to recognize the
defense.163 Enhancing efficiency ranked third in the ICN survey (20 of the
33 competition authorities citing goal).164 It too has a pleasant ring. (After
all, who advocates promoting inefficiency?) It too suffers infirmities.
1. The Term Efficiency Is Not Self-Defining, But Encompasses Different
Concepts
As the ICN noted, “[e]fficiency is a broad economic term that may refer
to allocative efficiency (allocation of resources to their most efficient use),
productive efficiency (production in the least costly way), or dynamic
efficiency (rate of introduction of new products or improvements of
products and production techniques).”165
Many of the surveyed competition agencies did not specify which
efficiencies were their goals.166 Indeed some efficiencies (dynamic) can be
more important than others (productive).167

What is important for our

purposes is that an antitrust policy that focuses on maximizing one type of
efficiency (e.g., productive) will not necessarily maximize other efficiencies
(e.g., dynamic).168
162

F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1088 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting efficiency
defense--whereby merging parties can defend merger by showing its creating significant
efficiencies in the relevant market, thereby offsetting any anti-competitive effects--“not
entirely clear” as a legal matter); see also John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The
Chicago School’s Foundation is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, Not Efficiency, in
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 73, at 93-94.
163
F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001). No court to date has
permitted a merger based on an efficiencies defense.
164
2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 12.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Policy Roundtables: Dynamic Efficiencies in
Merger Analysis 10 (May 22, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/22/40623561.pdf
[hereinafter OECD Dynamic Efficiencies].
168
William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust
Div., What Is Competition?, Seminar on Convergence Sponsored by the Netherlands
Ministry
of
Economic
Affairs
(Oct.
28,
2002),
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2. Difficulties in Measuring Efficiency
As Professor Brodley observes, “[p]ractical difficulties of courtroom
proof severely limit implementation of efficiency goals, however
important.”169

Ideally if maximizing efficiency were the goal, the

competition authority would calculate accurately the net present value of
each efficiency (e.g., value of new technologies) and inefficiency (e.g.,
disincentives to innovate post-merger, increase in waste) from the merger,
and the likely efficiencies/inefficiencies if the merger were prohibited. The
problem (especially in dynamic industries) is one cannot accurately
calculate with the current economic tools the merger’s impact on allocative,
productive, and dynamic efficiencies.

Although the 2010 Merger

Guidelines are an improvement in incorporating non-price dimensions on
competition, the new Guidelines, as FTC Commissioner Rosch observed,
still lack a clear framework for analyzing a merger’s impact on innovation,
variety, and other non-price competition.170
a. Difficulties in Measuring Allocative Efficiency
Courts, in particular the Ninth Circuit, state that “an act is deemed
anticompetitive under the Sherman Act only when it harms both allocative
efficiency and raises the prices of goods above competitive levels or
diminishes their quality.”171 The first problem, which these courts never
address, is that the term allocative efficiency has different meanings.172
The Ninth Circuit appears to define allocative efficiency as to “when
economic resources are allocated to their best use.”173 Its definition of

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm.
169
Brodley, supra note 114, at 1028.
170
Rosch, Next Challenges, supra note 115, at 7.
171
Hilton v. Children’s Hosp. San Diego, 315 F. App’x. 607, 609 (9th Cir. 2008);
Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995).
172
HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, at 83 (calling allocative efficiency a “more theoretical
and controversial concept” with “different economists and philosophers prefer[ing]
different definitions”).
173
Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433.
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allocative efficiency can be construed as perfect price discrimination: Each
consumer pays the highest price she is willing to pay (her reservation price),
and there is no deadweight welfare loss.174 While acceptable for some
economists, others find this price discrimination (and paying higher prices)
as unfair.175 Another problem is that price discrimination, with several
exceptions, is illegal.176
Another definition of allocative efficiency is Pareto efficiency, whereby
“resources are so allocated that it is not possible to make anyone better off
without making someone else worse off.”177 But this definition cannot
serve as the policy goal. As Posner observed, Pareto efficiency “has few
applications to the real world.”178 Many mergers make someone worse off:
competitors (by making the merged entity more efficient), suppliers and
distributors (by eliminating them or making the terms less favorable), and
customers (higher prices, reduced variety, less innovation).179
Some view allocative efficiency as “leading firms to produce output up
to the point where the marginal cost of each unit just equals the value of that

174

Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 96, at 92.
Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in
the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 735 (1986) (91% of individuals surveyed thought
charging higher prices to those more dependent on the product was offensive) [hereinafter
Fairness].
176
Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 554-56 (1990) (discussing when price
discrimination between a wholesaler and retailer violates the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(a)).
177
OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 65.
178
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (7th ed. 2007).
179
Likewise potential Pareto superiority fails on two levels: trying to assess how the
merger would affect the welfare of individuals and firms not before the court is beyond the
district court’s capabilities, and “Kaldor compensation principle works as a one off shot,
but fails in situations where multiple detriments occur to the same group of people.” PHIL
EVANS, IN SEARCH OF THE MARGINAL CONSUMER: THE FIPRA STUDY 18 (2008); Wolfgang
Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of an Economist
on the Normative Foundations of Competition Law, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND
COMPETITION LAW (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2009) (discussing criticisms of Kaldor-Hicks as
normative criterion for economic analysis of legal rules when gains and losses are
distributed unevenly among population).
175
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unit to consumers.”180 This has, at least, two problems. First, a product’s
marginal cost, courts have recognized, “is notoriously difficult to measure
and ‘cannot be determined from conventional accounting methods.’”181
Second, reducing price to marginal cost is not always desirable. Many
branded products (from your morning coffee to evening cocktail) are priced
above marginal cost and enjoy some market power.182 So an antitrust goal
of promoting marginal cost pricing conceivably would justify restricting
advertising, marketing, and product differentiation, which are at times
useful. Also pricing at marginal cost leaves little room for companies to
invest in innovation.183 “As Joseph Schumpeter first taught us,” a former
DOJ official said, “productive and dynamic efficiencies are at least as
important as static allocative efficiency in promoting economic growth.”184
To simplify further, courts can assess whether the restraint will diminish
allocative efficiency in that the price will rise above the competitive level or
quality, service, variety or innovation will diminish. But, as discussed
above,185 predicting a merger’s impact on price and non-price competition
180

William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration
of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 208
(2003).
181
United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ne.
Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981); Pac. Eng’g & Prod. Co. of
Nev. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 1977)). Because marginal cost
cannot be determined from conventional accounting methods, courts in predatory pricing
litigation use average variable cost as a surrogate. Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352,
1358 (9th Cir. 1976) (predatory pricing “could be shown by evidence that Shell was selling
its gasoline at below marginal cost or, because marginal cost is often impossible to
ascertain, below average variable costs”). But one criticism is that average variable cost is
a “poor surrogate.” HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, at 373.
182
Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1425, 1464.
183
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 30 (Australia noting how antitrust must account
firms’ earning sufficient returns to invest and innovate).
184
William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust
Div., Comparative Merger Control Analysis: Six Guiding Principles for Antitrust
Agencies—New
and
Old
(Mar.
18,
2002),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/10845.htm#N_5_.
185
See supra II.B.3.
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is often difficult.
b. Difficulties in Measuring Productive Efficiencies
As the antitrust agencies recognize, a merger’s likely productive
efficiencies “are difficult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the
information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the
merging firms.”186
As the agencies found, “efficiencies projected reasonably and in good
faith by the merging firms may not be realized.”187 Indeed many mergers
failed to deliver the promised efficiencies.188 Among the well-known biases
and heuristics relevant to the decision to enter in mergers and acquisitions,
which frequently result in value destroying transactions, are “myopia, loss
aversion, endowment effects, status quo bias, extremeness aversion, overoptimism, hindsight bias, anchoring heuristics, availability heuristics,
framing effects, representative bias, saliency effects, and others.”189
Executives in behavioral studies were overconfident in their ability to
manage a company, systematically underestimated their competitors’
strength, and were prone to self-serving interpretations of reality (e.g.,
taking credit for positive outcomes and blaming the environment for
186

U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 10
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html; Org. for
Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Policy Brief: Mergers and Dynamic Efficiencies 1 (Sept.
2008) (“even in a static analysis, determining whether a merger is likely to lead to
efficiencies and how they will compare with any anti-competitive effects the merger is
expected to cause is quite difficult), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/48/41359037.pdf
[hereinafter OECD Policy Brief].
187
2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 186, at 10.
188
DAVIDSON, supra note 52, at 64; Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance
and Competition Policy, Loyola University Chicago School of Law Research Paper No.
2011-006, at 48 (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681673
(examining evidence from corporate finance that suggests entire categories of mergers are
more likely to destroy, rather than enhance, shareholder value); Clayton M. Christensen et
al., The Big Idea: The New M&A Playbook, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at 49 (“study
after study puts the failure rate of mergers and acquisitions somewhere between 70% and
90%”); Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency: A Comment, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1116, 1117 n.8 (1987) (collecting earlier studies) [hereinafter Comment].
189
Waller, Corporate Governance, supra note 188, at 48.
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negative outcomes).190 Not only do many mergers fail to yield significant
efficiencies, the merger process itself, while benefitting investment bankers,
antitrust lawyers, and economic experts, can misallocate resources and
divert managerial talent “from creating things of real value.”191
Consequently, as one roundtable of competition authorities found,
“[m]aking a prospective determination about whether a merger will lead to
static efficiencies and how such efficiencies measure up against any anticompetitive effects that the merger is expected to cause can be very
challenging.”192 Given these challenges, agency lawyers and economists
can differ over whether the merging parties verified the efficiencies defense
to otherwise problematic mergers.193
Finally, allowing mergers to yield productive efficiencies can lessen
dynamic efficiency and endanger the overall economic system.194

As

Professor Horton, a veteran antitrust enforcer, recently argued from an
evolutionary biology perspective, “large economic concentrations such as
monopolies and oligopolies are vastly overrated in terms of their overall
efficiency and positive impacts on the current economic system, and that
190

Colin F. Camerer & Ulrike Malmendier, Behavioral Economics of Organizations,
in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 235, 246, 260-64 (Peter Diamond &
Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007). For several recent surveys of the empirical literature see
Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TENN.
J. BUS. L. 65, 71-74 (2011), http://trace.tennessee.edu/transactions/vol12/iss2/4; Mark
Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer, 6
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 2 (Spring 2010); C. Engel, The Behaviour of Corporate Actors:
A Survey of the Empirical Literature, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective
Goods
Preprint
No.
2008/23
7-8
(May
2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135184.
191
Adams & Brock, Comment, supra note 188, at 1120.
192
OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 167, at 9.
193
Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, Bureau of Economics, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Economic Issues: Merger Efficiencies at the Federal Trade Commission: 19972007 26 (Feb. 2009), www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf (noting
“substantial divergence in the efficiency acceptance rate” between FTC lawyers and
economists).
194
Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT
THE MARK, supra note 73, at 81.
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their dangerous impacts are increasingly underrated.”195
c. Difficulties in Measuring Dynamic Efficiencies
Dynamic efficiencies arise when firms innovate and foster technological
change and progress.196

Although the most important in improving

society’s well-being, dynamic efficiencies are the most difficult to
measure.197
One difficulty is determining when innovation benefits society.
Innovation involves introducing something new, “a new idea, method, or
device.”198 But not everything new is necessarily good. For example, some
financial innovations touted in the 1990s were heavily criticized for
contributing to the financial crisis.199 So promoting dynamic efficiencies
really means promoting socially beneficial innovations. The problem is
distinguishing between socially beneficial and harmful innovation for goods
and services that are still under development and have not reached the
market.200

A restraint may hinder innovation (such as preventing new

subprime mortgages that profit banks but worsen the consumers’ financial
condition), but leave society better off.
A second difficulty is measuring dynamic efficiency. In the 1990s, the
antitrust agencies offered a narrow view of an “innovation market,” namely
195

Horton, supra note 49, at 473.
OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 23.
197
OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 167, at 10 (noting “the uncertainty
inherent in innovative activity regarding its cost, timing, and the likelihood and extent of its
commercial success, difficulties in measuring innovation itself, the problem of how to
conceptually transform innovation into some measure of welfare, and informational
asymmetry between the merging parties and the enforcement agencies.”).
198
WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 591 (1979) (defining innovation).
199
GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P.
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE
(2009).
200
OECD Policy Brief, supra note 186, at 5 (recognizing the “almost always
uncertainty about how much innovative activity will cost, how long it will take and the
likelihood and extent of its commercial success”); Josef Drexl, Real Knowledge is to Know
the Extent of One’s Own Ignorance: On the Consumer Harm Approach in InnovationRelated Competition Cases (Dec. 3, 2009), Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property,
Competition & Tax Law Research Paper No. 09-15, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1517757.
196
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“research and development directed to particular new or improved goods or
processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development.”201
But this assumes that the input--specialized research and development
(“R&D”) assets or characteristics of specific firms--is a good proxy for the
output, socially beneficial innovation.202 There are also problems in using
outputs to measure innovation. Patents and copyrights are both underinclusive in measuring innovation (in not capturing processes and products
not subject to IP protection) and over-inclusive (not every patent or
copyright is socially beneficial).
A third difficulty is determining what hinders or promotes innovation,
and to what extent greater concentration/market power fosters more
innovation.203 The 2010 Merger Guidelines provide additional guidance of
when mergers are likely to diminish innovation competition by encouraging
the merged firm to curtail innovative efforts below the level that would
prevail absent the merger.204

But the Guidelines leave many issues

unresolved on evaluating a merger’s impact on innovation.205 At times, the
competition agencies as part of their competitive effects analysis predict

201

U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing
of
Intellectual
Property
§
3.2.3
(1995),
http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
202
OECD Policy Brief, supra note 186, at 5 (recognizing host of complicating factors
related to innovation).
203
STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF
INNOVATION 21 (2010) (discussing how openness and connectivity may be more important
for innovation than competition); Stucke, Monopolies, supra note 50, at 509-17.
204
Compare 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 186, at § 6.4 with U.S. Dep’t of
Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 n.6 (1992),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm (mentioning innovation in one
footnote).
205
Rosch, Next Challenges, supra note 115, at 9-10; see also Darren S. Tucker & Bilal
Sayyed, The Merger Guidelines Commentary: Practical Guidance and Missed
Opportunities,
ANTITRUST
SOURCE,
May
2006,
at
11-12,
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/06/05/May06-Tucker5=24f.pdf
(noting
significant omission of innovation in agencies’ 1992 guidelines and 2006 commentary).

40

RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS

[11-Aug-11

higher prices and less innovation post-merger.206 Given the difficulties in
measuring and predicting dynamic efficiencies, the agencies seldom
challenge mergers solely on dynamic efficiency grounds.207
Despite the importance of dynamic efficiencies, antitrust policy still has
inadequate tools to measure these efficiencies or assess the long-term
effects of many restraints on dynamic efficiency.208
3. How Current Antitrust Analysis Is Incomplete in Focusing on Some
Efficiencies (Such as Short-Term Productive Efficiencies) and not Other
Efficiencies and Inefficiencies
Efficiencies today are used as a shield, namely as a defense to an
otherwise anti-competitive merger.209

But if promoting efficiencies, as

some courts say, is antitrust’s primary goal, then inefficiency should be a
sword.

Courts and agencies–besides permitting mergers that yield

efficiencies--should block mergers that yield greater inefficiencies.
Conceivably a merger may yield greater efficiencies or inefficiencies.210
206

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commentary on the
Horizontal
Merger
Guidelines
18
(Mar.
2006),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm#42 (antitrust agencies “generally
focus on the likely effects of proposed mergers on prices paid by consumers,” but at times
allege in their complaints anti-competitive effects on non-price dimensions); Compl., In re
Koninklijke DSM N.V., Roche Holding AG, & Fritz Gerber, FTC File No. 031 0064,
Docket
No.
C-4098
(Sept.
22,
2003),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/dsmrochecomp.pdf (alleging among the acquisition’s
anticompetitive effects its reducing the parties’ incentives to improve service or product
quality or to pursue further innovation in the relevant market).
207
2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 31 (noting one country’s observation that “in
reality, the time horizon of reliable analysis often does not make it plausible to take into
consideration long term effects, even if the broader conceptual framework would allow
that”).
208
2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 186, at § 10 (“Other efficiencies, such as those
relating to research and development, are potentially substantial but are generally less
susceptible to verification and may be the result of anticompetitive output reductions.”).
209
Id.
210
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (“Many
people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative,
discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and
rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to
counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.”); OECD GLOSSARY, supra
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Accordingly, if market forces do not prevent mergers that yield greater
inefficiencies, then antitrust enforcers and courts would calculate and weigh
the multiple efficiencies and inefficiencies arising from a merger. To do so,
they need the tools to assess the likely allocative, productive, and dynamic
efficiencies and inefficiencies arising from each merger. They next must
have the tools to weigh the efficiencies and inefficiencies (including their
impact on the poor, whose marginal utility of income differs from wealthier
consumers), along with the other benefits, costs, and risks posed by the
merger. The problem is that no such tools exist today.211
Why don’t these tools exist? One reason is that neither the antitrust
agencies nor courts consider inefficiencies and other significant costs and
risks from a merger, which while less susceptible to quantification, can
inflict greater harm. Why don’t the competition agencies then consider the
inefficiencies and bring them to the courts’ attention? One explanation is
that promoting efficiencies is not their primary antitrust goal. But if it is,
another explanation is the agencies’ and courts’ belief perseverance in neoclassical economic theories premised on rational market participants. If one
strongly believes that market participants are rational profit-maximizers,
one can logically conclude that firms merge to maximize profits either
legally (through productive or dynamic efficiencies and other lawful means
(e.g., tax benefits)) or illegally (by lessening competition).

If the

government cannot prove that the merger will lead to more market power
note 140, at 86 (discussing inefficiency when monopoly faces less incentive or competitive
pressure to minimize costs of production, and increase the wasteful expenditures in things
“such as maintenance of excess capacity, luxurious executive benefits, political lobbying
seeking protection and favourable regulations, and litigation”); Roger Frantz, X-Efficiency
and Allocative Efficiency: What Have We Learned?, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 434 (1992);
Harvey Liebenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency,” 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392
(1966).
211
OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 167, at 5 (“general agreement that proving
a specific likelihood of claimed dynamic efficiencies and measuring their impact are
difficult tasks for which there are no easy approaches. At present, quantitative assessments
do not appear to be feasible.”).
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(e.g., prices post-merger will increase above competitive levels), then the
merger by default must maximize profits through legal means (e.g.,
efficiencies).212 Accordingly, there is greater concern over false positives
than negatives.213
This bi-polar outlook does not acknowledge the vast grey middle area of
mergers (think AOL-Time Warner and Daimler-Chrysler), where bounded
rational executives were overconfident about the efficiencies or merged to
build empires or ego (e.g., acquisitions of Hollywood movie studios).214
Market forces do not always punish the overconfident firms whose mergers
destroy shareholder value.

Consequently, it is easier to endorse an

efficiency goal if one makes simplifying, unrealistic assumptions about
competition (static price competition) and market participants (rational,
self-interested, fully informed).
If promoting efficiencies indeed were the goal, current antitrust analysis
is incomplete and at times leads to bad outcomes for the public. In recent
closing statements, for example, the DOJ highlighted the likely efficiencies
212

DAVIDSON, supra note 52, at 72-73, 78-79; Adams & Brock, supra note 37, at 292
(quoting Reagan’s first head of the Antitrust Division “Merger activity in general is a very,
very important feature of our capital markets by which assets are continuously moved into
the hands of those managers who can employ them efficiently” and that interfering with
mergers “would be an error of very substantial magnitude”); Debra A. Valentine, General
Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Global Mergers: Trade Issues and Alliances in the New
Millennium (Oct. 4-5, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvwiitmerger.shtm (“Most
mergers are motivated by goals of efficiency and improved performance, and from an
antitrust perspective are at least competitively benign.”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Accompanying Release of Revised 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 FED. REG. 26823-03
(Dep’t Justice 1984) (“most mergers do not threaten competition and that many are in fact
procompetitive and benefit consumers”).
213
See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 879 (while recognizing that its per se antitrust rules
provide guidance to the business community and minimize the burdens on litigants and the
judicial system, Court noting the risk of false positives from its per se rules in “prohibiting
procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage”); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (“Mistaken inferences and
the resulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct
the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))).
214
WU, supra note 33, at 225.
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from mergers in the highly concentrated telephone,215 satellite radio,216 and
airline217 industries. But the DOJ considered only one type of efficiency,
namely short-term productive efficiency gains, and only those efficiencies
that the merging firms identified.

The DOJ closing statements never

address the mergers’ impact on dynamic efficiency or potential long-term
costs.
As one example, the DOJ predicted that Whirlpool’s acquisition of
Maytag, which reduced the number of major appliance manufacturers in the
United States from four to three, was unlikely to reduce competition
substantially.218 The DOJ predicted that “any attempt to raise prices likely
would be unsuccessful;” consumers instead would benefit from the
merger’s estimated cost savings and other efficiencies.219 In reality, the
DOJ was wrong. Consumers ended up paying more (about 5 to 7 percent
more for Maytag dishwashers and about 17 percent more for Whirlpool
dryers) and had fewer choices post-merger.220
The reality today is that courts and agencies cannot maximize efficiency
as a goal unless they undertake a more extensive review. They cannot
215

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Statement by Assistant Attorney General
Thomas O. Barnett Regarding the Closing of the Investigation of AT&T’s Acquisition of
Bellsouth: Investigation Concludes That Combination Would Not Reduce Competition
(Oct. 11, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/218904.pdf.
216
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Statement of the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio
Holdings Inc.’s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio Inc.: Evidence Does Not Establish that
Combination of Satellite Radio Providers Would Substantially Reduce Competition (Mar.
24, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/231467.pdf.
217
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Statement of the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close its Investigation of the Merger of Delta Air
Lines
Inc.
and
Northwest
Airlines
Corporation
(Oct.
29,
2008),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/238849.htm.
218
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Department of Justice Antitrust Division
Statement on the Closing of its Investigation of Whirlpool’s Acquisition of Maytag (Mar.
29, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/215326.htm.
219
Id.
220
Orley C. Ashenfelter et al., The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers:
A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool (Apr. 21, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1857066.
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consider only some efficiencies (e.g., productive) that are easier to measure
(e.g., combining all the manufacturing post-merger in the one modern lowcost production facility).

They cannot rely on the merging parties’

efficiencies defense. They would have to devote more attention to the
harder

to

quantify,

yet

significantly

more

important,

dynamic

(in)efficiencies.221
Ironically an efficiency goal would make the courts and agencies more
skeptical about mergers yielding efficiencies; they would display greater
concern over false negatives than they do currently over false positives.
Many times efficiencies do not seem to motivate the merger.222

The

efficiency claims are mostly developed by antitrust lawyers and hired
experts, who sift through the companies’ documents and data, or extrapolate
from the company’s past experiences.223 Thus an efficiency goal logically
could lead to more active merger enforcement, whereby only those mergers
where the efficiencies are substantiated and likely are permitted.
4. Rule-of-Law Concerns if Promoting Efficiencies is Antitrust’s Goal
If promoting efficiencies is antitrust’s primary goal, any legal
presumption raises the risk of false positives and negatives. Accordingly,
the legal analysis must remain case and fact specific.

This lessens

predictability, and increases compliance costs and rule-of-law concerns.224
Predicting the dynamic, allocative, and productive efficiencies from the
challenged merger (or restraint) affords the agencies, courts, and defendants

221

OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 167, at 10 (although competition
authorities want dynamic efficiency considerations to feature more frequently and
prominently in merger decisions, the “real-world problem is that no one has figured out a
robust way to do that yet, and rather than engage in speculation, courts have tended to
avoid dynamic efficiency analysis in cases where it could have been relevant”).
222
Given dynamic efficiencies’ importance in providing a competitive advantage, it is
surprising that merging firms have “tended to ignore dynamic efficiencies, too.” OECD
Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 167, at 11.
223
2006 Guidelines Commentary, supra note 206, at 51.
224
HAYEK, supra note 50, at 114.
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ample discretion, with little assurance of accuracy, consistency, objectivity,
and transparency. Nations differ widely “as to how economic efficiency
itself can be best achieved, depending in part on the different comparative
advantages of the economy concerned.”225
A merger, for example, may yield significant dynamic or productive
efficiencies but higher prices.226 Some consumers may value lower priced
homogenous goods; others are willing to pay more for greater innovation in
the industry.

In different industries and societies, different efficiencies

(e.g., dynamic, productive, and allocative) can increase (or decrease) to
different degrees citizens’ well-being.227 The goal of promoting efficiencies
does not inform the agencies and courts how to make these tradeoffs, and
there is often no way to determine whether they made the proper tradeoff.228
Promoting efficiency would require judges and agencies to engage in
industrial policy, rather than to secure compliance with existing competition
laws. As the Supreme Court said nearly 40 years ago, “courts are of limited
utility in examining difficult economic problems.”229 Also, Congress never
intended the courts to decide antitrust cases based on the courts’ conception
of the latest economic thinking.230 Not only are the courts and agencies

225

Richard Bronk, Which Model of Capitalism?, OECD OBSERVER, Summer 2000,
http://249.pressflex.net/news/fullstory.php/aid/345/Which_model_of_capitalism_.html.
226
2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 186, at § 6 (“merger may increase prices in the
short term but not raise longer-term concerns about innovation, either because rivals will
provide sufficient innovation competition or because the merger will generate cognizable
research and development efficiencies”).
227
Brodley, supra note 114, at 1026-27.
228
Carlton, supra note 86 (if “one adopts a (short run) total surplus standard (or long
run consumer surplus standard), it will be more difficult to verify whether agency officials
are achieving their objectives”).
229
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
230
Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, Control of Corporations, Persons, and
Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce, S. REP. NO. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913),
reprinted in I.v Kintner, supra note 50, at 999 (writing in response to the Court’s
enunciation of its rule-of-reason standard in 1911, “[i]t is inconceivable that in a country
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politically unaccountable for their industrial policies, they are ill equipped
to resolve the complex economic issues that competition cases raise.231
“The judicial power involves the responsibility for interpreting and
administering the law and settling disputes,” noted one judge,
“[r]esponsibility for resolving economic issues is a matter for the legislative
branch of the Government.”232
5. Problem of Efficiency as a Normative Goal
Maximizing efficiency, from an utilitarian perspective, does not
necessarily promote overall well-being. There comes a point where the
marginal cost from the incremental efficiency gain outweighs its benefit.
Moreover, aside from the utilitarian cost-benefit framework, citizens
may want to preserve other rights and values (such as economic freedom)
for their own sake. In rejecting a pure efficiency rationale for punitive
damages, the Court observed that “[c]itizens and legislators may rightly
insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in
order to deter what they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit costbeneficial morally offensive conduct; efficiency is just one consideration
among many.”233 Thus if citizens (i) do not prize efficiency for its own
sake and (ii) have different thresholds where they prize other values over
the incremental efficiency gain, then in any democracy, promoting
governed by a written Constitution and statute law the courts can be permitted to test each
restraint of trade by the economic standard which the individual members of the court may
happen to approve”); MISES, supra note 43, at 35 (“characteristic feature that distinguishes
[the constitutional state] from despotism is that not the authorities but the duly elected
people’s representatives have to decide what best serves the commonweal”).
231
For example, in one 1950s survey of judges, 22 judges thought it desirable for
courts to resolve the economic issues that antitrust cases raise, 19 found it undesirable, 10
provided qualified responses, 5 tended toward a favorable answer, 3 felt it preferable for
antitrust cases heard in an administrative proceeding in the first instance, 2 thought it
desirable that at least some of the economic issues be determined by a nonjudicial body.
BURNS, supra note 75, at 11.
232
Id.
233
Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 439-40 (2001) (quoting
Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1450 (1993)).

11-Aug-11]

RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS

47

efficiencies cannot be sole goal.234
Antitrust policy, rather than simply promote efficiencies, can be an
important mechanism to disperse economic and political power and
promote individual freedom.235

The concentration of private or

governmental economic power is problematic--not only on utilitarian
efficiency grounds—given its risks to any democracy.
Consequently, courts must acknowledge their and the antitrust agencies’
limitations. Promoting efficiencies is a feasible goal for market
fundamentalists and socialist central planners, who have a unifying theory
of how markets work, how market participants behave, and how efficiencies
can be maximized. But in dynamic markets, the process is imperfectly
understood; the outcomes are often indeterminate.236 There is no conscious
design; no DNA from which one can estimate the probabilities of different
outcomes; no tools to weigh the discounted values of the efficiencies and
inefficiencies. In reality the antitrust agencies and generalist courts do not
know whether, and how often, they accurately assess the likelihood and
magnitude of the allocative, productive and dynamic (in)efficiencies from
mergers and other restraints of trade.237 They have neither the tools nor
knowledge to undertake this analysis. Even if they did, such analysis would
raise significant rule-of-law concerns, and could conflict with important
political, social, and moral values in any democracy.
234

Bronk, supra note 225 (“In the field of economics and business, the search for such
an elusive balance has been not merely for an optimal trade-off between social fairness and
economic efficiency but also for the most efficient model of capitalism itself.”).
235
DAVIDSON, supra note 52, at 13; Adams & Brock, supra note 37, at 271; Lawrence
Anthony Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of
Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1222-23 (1977).
236
JOHN KAY, OBLIQUITY: WHY OUR GOALS ARE BEST ACHIEVED INDIRECTLY 157
(2010).
237
The agencies rarely do post-merger reviews, assess to what extent the claimed
productive efficiencies were realized, and examine the merger’s impact on dynamic
efficiencies, to the extent quantifiable. Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke,
Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1560-63, 1574 (2011).
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D. Why Ensuring Economic Freedom Never Unified Antitrust Policy
U.S. courts have recognized the antitrust laws as a “charter of
liberty.”238 They protect competitors’ economic freedom to compete.239
They seek to maximize the “freedom of opportunity for consumers and for
present and prospective businessmen as well.”240

Ensuring economic

freedom was the fourth most popular goal in the 2007 ICN survey.241
Indeed this goal encompasses other goals in the ICN survey, such as
ensuring a level playing field for small and mid-sized enterprises,242 and
promoting fairness and equality.243 Although promoting economic freedom
has a pleasant democratic ring, it too cannot be the primary goal.
Humans are social animals.

Invariably, the exercise of economic

freedom by some market participants will constrain the freedom of
others.244 The Court recognized early in the Sherman Act’s history that
every contract among market participants conceivably restrains trade.245 A
resale price maintenance (“RPM”) policy increases the manufacturer’s
economic freedom (in setting the minimum or maximum retail price of its
goods) while limiting the retailers’ freedom (in setting the price of the
238

See supra note 63; 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890) (Sen. Sherman).
See supra notes 56, 59, 61; 2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 14-15 (in the United
States, “[a] notion of freedom–of either the dominant firm or of powerless firms–is implicit
in many decisions” as “[t]he United States antitrust law also reflects an objective to
preserve freedom of firms, as contrasted with government regulation of firms”) (quoting
Professor Eleanor Fox).
240
Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
377, 384 (1965) (antitrust laws “expand the range of consumer choice and entrepreneurial
opportunity by encouraging the formation of markets of numerous buyers and sellers,
assuring ease of entry to such markets, and protecting participants—particularly small
businessmen—against exclusionary practices”).
241
2007 ICN Report, supra note 82, at 14.
242
Id. at 17 (promotes “equitable opportunity to participate in the economy”).
243
Id. at 18.
244
Id. at 16 (noting “challenge of balancing the economic freedoms of different market
participants”).
245
See, e.g., Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898) (arguing that
Sherman Act “must have a reasonable construction, or else there would scarcely be an
agreement or contract among business men that could not be said to have, indirectly or
remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain it”).
239
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manufacturer’s goods). Conversely, a policy prohibiting RPM limits the
manufacturer’s freedom, while increasing the retailers’ freedom. Promoting
market freedom, observed Professors Adams and Brock, can lead to the
evils that the antitrust laws seek to prevent, namely “monopolization,
oligopolization, collusion, and anticompetitive mergers and ‘joint
ventures.’”246
One classic example is Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, where the
dominant newspaper refused to accept advertising from local merchants
who advertised with the small competing radio station.247 Because of its
monopoly of local advertising in the community and its practically
indispensable coverage of 99 percent of the local residents, the newspaper
forced numerous merchants to stop advertising with the radio station. The
monopolist asserted its economic freedom as a private business to select its
customers and to refuse to accept advertisements from whomever it
pleases.248

But in exercising its economic freedom, the monopolist

infringed the economic freedom of the local merchants and radio station,
which absent the restraint, would contract with one another. The Court did
not dispute the monopolist’s general right to refuse to deal, but recognized
that:
the word ‘right’ is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy
to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one
in the conclusion. Most rights are qualified. The right claimed by
the publisher is neither absolute nor exempt from regulation. Its
exercise of a purposeful means of monopolizing interstate commerce
is prohibited by the Sherman Act. The operator of the radio station,
equally with the publisher of the newspaper, is entitled to the
protection of that Act.249
246

WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR,
AND GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 304 (2d ed. 2004).
247

342 U.S. 143, 149-50 (1951).
Id. at 155.
249
Id.
248
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Consequently, promoting economic freedom inherently involves trading off
some people’s freedom to promote others’. To make that trade-off, one
invariably relies on other values and goals besides economic freedom.
Accordingly economic freedom cannot be the primary goal.
E. The End of the Policy Cycle
With the quest for a single economic goal, antitrust progressively
became less relevant during the past policy cycle. Among the wreckage
from the financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession are the laissez-faire
economic beliefs.250 Bork began the last policy cycle by noting several
antitrust paradoxes.251 Today antitrust suffers greater paradoxes.
One paradox is that in the quest for a single economic goal, antitrust
policy in the U.S. now lacks any clear unifying goal. No consensus exists
in defining or measuring consumer welfare or designing legal standards to
further this goal. Of course competition officials can agree that prohibiting
certain egregiously anticompetitive behavior (such as price-fixing cartels)
can promote their economic goal (whether it is consumer welfare,
efficiency, or economic freedom). But these restraints were condemned
when antitrust recognized multiple goals. Moreover in the context of other
coordinated conduct (such as group boycott) and monopolization, the
current economic goals cannot provide quantifiable objective benchmarks
to guide and assess antitrust policy.
To achieve consensus, as the ICN surveys reflect, the antitrust goal

250

See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 52; JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL
MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); GEORGE
A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES
THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009); John Cassidy,
Letter from Chicago: After the Blowup, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 28; Paul Krugman,
How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009, at 37 (noting that more
important than the economists’ failure to predict was “the profession’s blindness to the
very possibility of catastrophic failures in the market economy”).
251
BORK, supra note 40, at 4, 125 (criticizing antitrust policy which did not
sufficiently account productive efficiencies).
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accordingly becomes more abstract and less meaningful. The surveyed
competition authorities achieved greater consensus as the objectives became
more open-ended and the relationship between the goal and specific actions
necessary to promote the goal became less defined.
A second paradox is that in the past decade the Court has complained
about the state of federal antitrust law (e.g., the interminable litigation,
inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase, and its fear over the
unusually high risk of inconsistent results by antitrust courts), but it was the
Court who has created this predicament. During the past antitrust cycle, the
Court increasingly relied on its fact-specific weighing standard, the rule-ofreason,252 and a vague economic goal (consumer welfare) that
accommodated different personal values and interpretation, and often
pointed to no particular course of action.
A third paradox is, as Professor Eleanor Fox describes, the efficiency
paradox: “by trusting dominant firm strategies and leading firm
collaborations to produce efficiency, modern U.S. antitrust protects
monopoly and oligopoly, suppresses innovative challenges, and stifles
efficiency.”253

While

antitrust

policymakers

recognize

dynamic

competition as more important, in the past policy cycle, antitrust agencies
and courts “tended to avoid dynamic efficiency analysis” focusing instead
on a static price competition and productive efficiencies.254 Courts and
antitrust agencies applied a light touch to merger review under a fear of
252

California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 08-55671, 2011 WL 2684942, at *11 n.10
(9th Cir. July 12, 2011) (court under “rule of reason weighs legitimate justifications for a
restraint against any anticompetitive effects. We review all the facts, including the precise
harms alleged to the competitive markets, and the legitimate justifications provided for the
challenged practice, and we determine whether the anticompetitive aspects of the
challenged practice outweigh its procompetitive effects.”) (quoting Paladin Assocs., Inc. v.
Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)).
253
Fox, Efficiency Paradox, supra note 73, at 77.
254
OECD Policy Brief, supra note 186, at 4; see also DAVIDSON, supra note 52, at 8586 (intellectual confinement of antitrust to static price competition when dynamic
competition provides the greater benefits).
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false positives and a belief that most mergers promote efficiencies, even
though the empirical literature suggests the contrary.255

While the

efficiencies defense developed in the past policy cycle, antitrust enforcers
and courts did not account for post-merger inefficiencies or the competitive
distortions in creating firms too-big-and-too-integral-to-fail.256
A fourth paradox is the economic power paradox. Our constitutional
framework seeks to distribute power, rather than promote its consolidation
or concentration.257

Despite the historical concerns about concentrated

economic power, antitrust policymakers in the last policy cycle “no longer
concern[ed] themselves with preventing bigness, and indeed tend[ed]
instead to encourage large-scale enterprise for efficiency’s sake.”258 While
we saw in nature the benefits of diversity,259 we disregarded in one of our
most important industries, the financial services markets, the dangers of
concentration and systemic risk.260 Despite the public and governmental
concern about protecting small businesses from unfair competitive tactics,
and the importance of small companies in promoting dynamic efficiencies,
the Court now praises monopolies.
A fifth paradox is that while trust, fairness, and prosocial behavior are
vital to the functioning of a market economy,261 antitrust policy ignores
these values, and treats market participants as amoral self-interested profit-

255

OECD Policy Brief, supra note 186, at 6; Reeves & Stucke, supra note 237, at
1560-61.
256
Markham, supra note 34, at 314.
257
See supra note 235.
258
Markham, supra note 34, at 264.
259
Horton, supra note 49, at 485.
260
Id. at 491.
261
LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE
19 (2011); Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Trust and Finance, 2 NBER REP. 16, 17-18
(2011); Horton, supra note 49, at 474, 476, 502, 520 (arguing how fundamental human
values of fairness and reciprosity not only enhance trust, but create a healthier, more stable,
more efficient economic ecosystem); Joseph Henrich et al., Markets, Religion, Community
Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment, 327 SCIENCE 1480 (2010).
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maximizers.262
A sixth antitrust paradox, observed Professor Jesse Markham, was how
during the past policy cycle the government’s “laissez-faire policies . . . led
to unprecedented government intervention in the private sector.”263
III. IS A SINGLE UNIFYING GOAL A WORTHWHILE PURSUIT?
As Part II shows, identifying a single antitrust goal, such as promoting
consumer welfare, is easy. The open-ended objective simply shifts the
debate to defining the term and the means of attaining that end. A single
objective is always available; the trade-off is greater abstraction. This Part
examines whether pursuing a single goal is a worthwhile pursuit in the next
policy cycle.
In today’s global economy, a single, well-defined objective has benefits.
Nations’ antitrust objectives can conflict. Unless the merging firms can
carve out one jurisdiction, one country will impose its objectives on
another.

Transparent, well-defined policy objectives can help increase

convergence of the ensuing legal standards, harmonize enforcement among
competition authorities, reduce compliance costs on industries, limit the
ability of entrenched firms to secure state aid or legal barriers to protect
their market power, and lower entry barriers for importers.
But as this Part examines, the lack of a well-defined unifying goal is not
for want of mental capacity or incentives. This is not the case where we
squeeze “the universe into a ball, To roll it toward some overwhelming
question, To say: ‘I am Lazarus, come from the dead, Come back to tell you
all, I shall tell you all.’”264 Antitrust simply does not lend itself to a single
262

Reeves & Stucke, supra note 237, at 1536-38; Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That
What I Want? Competition Policy & the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 893 (2010).
263
Markham, supra note 34, at 313 (discussing how antitrust neither prevented nor
redressed the recent systemic threats caused directly by companies too big and integral to
the functioning of markets).
264
T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in T. S. ELIOT: COLLECTED POEMS,
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well-defined objective.
A. As an Initial Premise, Antitrust Policy Ultimately Must Promote (or at
Least Not Impede) Citizens’ Well-Being
Competition, however defined, is not the ultimate end. Competition
instead represents the means “to achieve broader government objectives for
the economy or for a given industry.”265
If competition is not an end, but the more efficient (or democratic)
means to achieve other goals, this has three implications: first, there must
be one or more ultimate goals, with perhaps other intermediary goals.
Second, one must have a form of competition in mind, and how, and under
what circumstances, one’s conception of competition can promote or
impede one’s ultimate objectives. Third, one must understand how the
formal legal and informal institutions can promote one’s conception of
competition.
As an initial premise, competition’s ultimate goal is to improve wellbeing.266 Competition can be bitter. But we take such bitters to improve
overall well-being, not simply to be miserable.

If as a result of our

competition policy our physical and mental health deteriorates, our isolation
and distrust increases, and our freedom and self-determination decrease,
then the policy is not worthwhile. A competition policy, which simply
1909-1962 6 (1991).
265
Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affairs Competition Comm., Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Global Forum on Competition: Roundtable on Bringing Competition
into
Regulated
Sectors
2
(2005),
http://
www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/compcomm/2005-Roundtable%20on%CC20Bringing%
20Competition.pdf.
266
United States v. W. Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 326 (D.D.C. 1991) (predicting that
“the concentration of the sources of information of the American people in just a few
dominant, collaborative conglomerates . . . would be inimical to the objective of a
competitive market, the purposes of the antitrust laws, and the economic wellbeing of the
American people”), aff’d, 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Org. for Econ. Co-Operation &
Dev.,
Competition
Assessment
Toolkit
3
(2007),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/59/39679833.pdf (increased competition “can improve a
country’s economic performance, open business opportunities to its citizens and reduce the
cost of goods and services throughout the economy”).
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involves a rush for scarce resources, where many are trampled or left
scrambling for the scraps, would appeal to the few who captured the
resources. So our conception of competition (as defined in part by our
competition policy) must promote (or at least not impede) overall wellbeing.
Some will ask whether this is too much to ask of antitrust.

Let

competition policy improve the allocation of scarce resources, reduce the
costs of goods and services, and maximize overall wealth. Leave wellbeing to individual choice or supplementary governmental policies. We do
not require other laws, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
regulations on frozen cherry pies,267 to promote overall well-being. Why
should antitrust bear this burden?
One premise of our economic system of private enterprise is the
importance of free competition.

The Small Business Act’s policy

declaration summarizes this philosophy:
The essence of the American economic system of private enterprise
is free competition. Only through full and free competition can free
markets, free entry into business, and opportunities for the
expression and growth of personal initiative and individual judgment
be assured. The preservation and expansion of such competition is
basic not only to the economic well-being but to the security of this
Nation. . . .268
Congress’s policy statement incorporates three important premises. First,
competition does not exist independently of the legal and informal
institutions. As economist R.H. Coase said, “the legal system will have a
profound effect on the working of the economic system and may in certain
respects be said to control it.”269
267

21 C.F.R. § 152.126.
15 U.S.C. § 631.
269
R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713,
717-18 (1992); see also HAYEK, supra note 50, at 87 (competition “depends, above all, on
268
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Second, the types of competition (fair versus unfair) can vary depending
upon the legal and informal institutions.270 The term “competition on the
merits”

invariably

involves

normative

considerations

of

unfair

competition.271 The legal and informal institutions provide the rules of the
game necessary for that type of competition to function effectively;272 and
thereby affect the market participants’ incentives.273

As economist

Douglass North notes, “How the game is actually played is a consequence
of the formal structure [e.g., formal rules, including those set by the
government], the informal institutional constraints [e.g., societal norms and
conventions], and the enforcement characteristics.”274

A market’s

performance characteristics are a function of these institutional constraints.
The rules will define the opportunity set in the economy. Changing the
the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed both to preserve
competition and to make sure it operates as beneficially as possible.”).
270
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (empowering and directing FTC to prevent persons,
from “using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce”); F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972)
(FTC “in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard
of fairness, . . . like a court of equity, considers public values beyond simply those
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws”); HAYEK, supra
note 50, at 86.
271
See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611
n.32 (1985) (defining exclusionary conduct as behavior that “not only (1) tends to impair
the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or
does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way”) (internal quotation omitted); United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588-89 (1957) (“primary issue is whether
du Pont’s commanding position as General Motors’ supplier of automotive finishes and
fabrics was achieved on competitive merit alone, or because its acquisition of the General
Motors’ stock, and the consequent close intercompany relationship, led to the insulation of
most of the General Motors’ market from free competition, with the resultant likelihood, at
the time of suit, of the creation of a monopoly”).
272
See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE
232-265 (1998); Wolfgang Kerber, Competition, Innovation and Maintaining Diversity
Through Competition Law 15, in ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO COMPETITION LAW:
FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1543725 (noting Ordoliberal concept of shaping rules for this
market game so that only quality of performance (merit) determines “market success”).
273
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 158
(2005).
274
Id. at 52.
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rules can lead to different outcomes.275 If the antitrust laws reward (or are
indifferent to) monopolization, monopolies will be the likely outcome in
markets conducive to monopolization.276
Third, some types of competition (“full and free”) promote overall
well-being. Other types of competition, such as the “exploitation of child
labor, the chiseling of workers’ wages, the stretching of workers’ hours, are
not necessary, fair, or proper methods of competition”277 and hinder wellbeing.278
Accordingly, legal institutions (including antitrust law)279 and informal
ethical, moral, and social norms280 can promote overall well-being to the
extent they promote fair competition and deter unfair competition.
Consequently, the stronger our belief in the importance of preserving and
expanding fair competition to promote overall well-being, the greater
antitrust’s role in defining and deterring unfair competition. In describing
the antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, as “the
Magna Carta of free enterprise,” the Supreme Court said the antitrust laws
275

Kerber, supra note 272, at 16.
See NORTH, supra note 273, at 50.
277
Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress Transmitting
Recommendations Relative to the Strengthening and Enforcement of Antitrust Laws, Apr.
29. 1938, S. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938), reprinted in I.iv Kintner, supra
note 50, at 3407.
278
Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 43 (1987) (construing 29 U.S.C.
§ 202(a), where industries whose labor conditions are detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers constitute an unfair method of competition).
279
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Boeing Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1229 (M.D. Fla.
2004) (“fundamental objective of our antitrust laws is to promote fair competition for the
benefit of all consumers”) (quoting Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc., 13 F.3d
366, 368 (10th Cir. 1993)); American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494
F.2d 3, 14 (5th Cir. 1974) (tort of unfair competition “is an equitable concept, resting on
general principles of fairness in business practices”).
280
See, e.g., Henrich et al., supra note 261, at 1480 (studying how informal religious
norms can play an important role in supporting a competitive market economy); Mark
Granovetter, The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes, 19 J. ECON. PERSP.
33, 35 (2005) (“when economic and non-economic activity are intermixed, non-economic
activity affects the costs and the available techniques for economic activity”).
276
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“are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our freeenterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental

personal

freedoms.”281

Thus

antitrust

promotes

fair

competition, which in turn will promote the good life.282
If antitrust’s ultimate goal is promoting well-being, our next issue is
what constitutes well-being. One definition is “the state of being happy,
healthy, or prosperous.”283

But being prosperous or healthy does not

necessarily mean greater happiness. Well-being, as the OECD found, is
multi-faceted. Promoting well-being entails promoting (i) material wellbeing (income and wealth, housing, and jobs and earnings) and (ii) quality
of life (health status, work and life balance, education and skills, social
connections, civic engagement and governance, environmental quality,
personal security, and subjective well-being).284
Should antitrust law then promote (i) only material well-being or (ii)
both material well-being and quality of life? Advances in the happiness
economic literature will enable policymakers to tailor governmental policies
to promote well-being (or at least minimize sources of unhappiness, such as
unemployment, mental illness, or inadequate health care).285

But it is

apparent from the available evidence that one cannot maximize well-being
by maximizing only one component.

281

United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
Karel Van Miert, European Comm’n, Role of Competition Policy in Modern
Economies,
before
Danish
Competition
Council
(Oct.
11,
1997),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1997_061_en.html (“Competition policy is
there to help us achieve economic prosperity and increase the welfare of society.”).
283
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1342 (10th ed. 1995).
284
Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Better Life Initiative: Compendium of OECD
Well-Being
Indicators
6
(2011),
http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3746,en_2649_201185_47916764_1_1_1_1,00.html
[hereinafter OECD Well-Being]; see also Enrico Giovannini et al., A Framework to
Measure the Progress of Societies, Draft OECD Working Paper 2, 5, 14 (Sept. 2009).
285
DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN LEARN FROM
THE NEW RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING 51 (2010).
282

11-Aug-11]

RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS

59

After one’s basic needs are met, the economic literature shows,
increasing income and wealth do not significantly increase well-being.286
One of the few well-being metrics where America excels is material wellbeing. The average household disposable income in the U.S. in 2008 was
$37,690 per year, and average U.S. household’s financial worth was an
estimated $98,440, which were much higher than the OECD averages,
$22,284 and $36,808, respectively.287 Increasing aggregate material wellbeing will not necessarily increase overall well-being.288 If a larger pie
means greater wealth inequality, the wealthier will not be necessarily
happier,289 and there will be greater incentives for the wealthy to use the law
to safeguard their interests.290

Promoting wealth maximization (to the

exclusion of other values) can also promote status competition, selfishness,

286

In multivariate regressions, income as it correlates to subjective happiness
evaluations has a low coefficient. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists
Learn from Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 402, 410 (2002); see also Daniel
Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life But Not Emotional
Well-Being, PNAS EARLY EDITION 3 (2010) (finding from U.S. survey of subjective wellbeing that beyond approximately $75,000, higher income “is neither the road to
experienced happiness nor the road to the relief of unhappiness or stress, although higher
income continues to improve individuals’ life evaluations”); Elizabeth Dunn et al.,
Spending Money on Others Promotes Happiness, SCIENCE, Mar. 21, 2008, at 1687.
287
OECD
Better
Life
Initiative:
United
States,
http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/united-states/.
288
The economic literature, for example, did not identify a correlation between the
doubling of wealth in the U.S. between 1945 and 1991 and greater happiness. BOK, supra
note 285, at 11-12; RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 29-30
(2005). Despite substantial increases in economic well-being, China’s citizens are not
significantly happier. Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the
Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 3-24 (2006) (contrasting
China’s rapid economic growth between 1994 and 2005 (“real income per capita increasing
by a factor of 2.5”) and improvements for material well-being (e.g., “ownership of color
television sets rose from 40 percent of households to 82 percent, and the fraction with a
telephone jumped from 10 percent to 63 percent”) with no increase in reported life
satisfaction (“the percentage of people who say they are dissatisfied has increased, and the
percentage who say they are satisfied has decreased”)).
289
BOK, supra note 285, at 12.
290
Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 33940 (2010).
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and envy, and marginalize other values correlated with greater happiness.291
Thus the greater issue is fairness, namely how well the resources are
distributed.292 Income inequality in the U.S. increased significantly during
the past antitrust policy cycle.293 The U.S. has “the fourth highest rate of
income inequality and relative poverty (17.3% of people [are] poor
compared to an OECD average of 11.1%) in the OECD.”294 Other policy
challenges involve quality of life issues, such as work and life balance,295
social connections,296 safety,297 and environmental quality, including how
efficiently the U.S. uses its natural resources.298
Consequently in developed countries, like the United States, an antitrust
goal to maximize wealth (to the exclusion of other goals) will not
necessarily increase (and can reduce) overall well-being. To maximize
291

For many, well-being extends beyond satisfying one’s desires to include a moral
life. On an individual level, the primary sources of happiness are family relationships,
employment, community and friends, health, self-control or autonomy, personal ethical and
moral values, and the quality of the environment. BOK, supra note 285, at 17; LAYARD,
supra note 288, at 62–73; DANIEL NETTLE, HAPPINESS: THE SCIENCE BEHIND YOUR SMILE
85, 87 (2005). Prosocial spending is also associated with greater happiness. Lara B. Aknin
et al., Prosocial Spending and Well-Being: Cross-Cultural Evidence for a Psychological
Universal, Harv. Bus. School Working Paper 11-038 at 8, 13 (2010),
www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-038.pdf (observing a positive relationship in prosocial
spending and subjective well-being in 122 of 136 surveyed countries and in experiment
involving Canadians and Ugandans).
292
Wealth inequality was a historic antitrust concern. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2455,
2460 (Mar. 21, 1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (identifying this inequality of condition,
wealth, and opportunity as the greatest threat to social order, and stating that this inequality
“has grown within a single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast
combinations to control production and trade and to break down competition”).
293
Stucke, Lessons, supra note 290, at 334-39.
294
Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Society at a Glance–OECD Social Indicators,
Key Findings: United States (2011), www.oecd.org/els/social/indicators/SAG.
295
OECD, Better Life, supra note 287 (“Evidence suggests that long work hours may
impair personal health, jeopardize safety and increase stress. People in the United States
work 1768 hours a year, higher than the OECD average of 1739 hours.”).
296
Id.
297
Id. (noting how United States’ homicide rate is “higher than the OECD average and
one of the highest in the OECD”).
298
Id. See also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Report to Congressional Addressees,
Key Indicator Systems: Experiences of Other National and Subnational Systems Offer
Insights for the United States, GAO-11-396 (Apr. 12, 2011), available at
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-396.
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well-being, any competition policy must balance the promotion of material
wellbeing with quality of life factors such as freedom and selfdetermination, while not deterring the exercise of compassion and
interpersonal relationships.
This is not difficult to imagine. Competition in dispersing political and
economic power can increase economic opportunity and personal
autonomy,299 a key predictor of happiness.300 Citizens can choose to
purchase from (and work for) firms that align with their personal religious
and ethical values.301 When a firm engages in exploitative, unfair behavior,
a competitive market provides alternatives.302 Positive sum competition
provides richer social connections as people use their personal “vigor,
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity” to help others.303
299

In promoting

United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388 (1923) (“Sherman Act
was intended to secure equality of opportunity, and to protect the public against evils
commonly incident to monopolies, and those abnormal contracts and combinations which
tend directly to suppress the conflict for advantage called competition—the play of the
contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest desire for gain”); Charles A. Ramsay
Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of U.S. & Can., 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923) (“fundamental
purpose of the Sherman Act was to secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public
against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade”).
300
BOK, supra note 285, at 23; NETTLE, supra note 291, at 74.
301
Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), 524 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 2008) (antitrust
injury includes “[c]oercive activity that prevents its victims from making free choices
between market alternatives”) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 (1983)); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 19 (3d ed. 1990) (“When
the no-barriers-to-entry condition of perfect competition is satisfied, individuals are free to
choose whatever trade or profession they prefer, limited only by their own talent and skill
and by their ability to raise the (presumably modest) amount of capital required.”); HAYEK,
supra note 50, at 127.
302
Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 6, 9
(1st Cir. 2001) (“central aim of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers against certain
abusive business practices-especially price-fixing and monopoly); Kahneman et al.,
Fairness, supra note 175, at 735.
303
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); OECD WellBeing, supra note 284, at 14 (“Not only [the availability of jobs and earnings] increase
people’s command over resources, but they also provide people with a chance to fulfill
their own ambitions, to develop skills and abilities, to feel useful in society and to build
self-esteem.”).
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productive and dynamic efficiencies, antitrust can promote sustainable
consumption and production. Greater productive efficiency can increase
leisure time (which employees can use to contribute their unique skills to
community voluntary work).304

In enabling these activities, which are

correlated generally with healthier and happier people, competition can
promote well-being.
B. Competition Policy Cannot Exclude Social, Political, and Moral
Objectives
If maximizing well-being entails a blended approach, the next issue is
whether antitrust should promote only economic objectives. Limiting
antitrust to economic goals, a former FTC chair said, frees competition law
from normative judgments: “Antitrust finally regarded enhancing consumer
welfare as the single unifying goal of competition policy, and it used a
framework that was based on sound economics, both theoretical and
empirical.”305 Another antitrust official warned, “the inclusion of other,
non-competition values is very dangerous, and we need to be very careful
with it.”306 He cautioned the danger of getting involved “in politically
charged issues by reference to populism,” which poses a “great danger of
diluting our competition principles.”307

If competition authorities

incorporate “extraneous social and political values into [their] decision
making,” then their “competition-based analysis will be polluted by values
that, while important, just do not belong in sound competition analysis.”308
304

BOK, supra note 285, at 20 (discussing research on how attending monthly club
meetings or volunteering once a month is associated with a change in well-being equivalent
to a doubling of income).
305
Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the
Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 388
(2003).
306
R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div.,
Competition
and
Politics
2
(June
6,
2005),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/210522.htm.
307
Id. at 3.
308
Id. at 6.
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This brings to mind the character General Jack D. Ripper’s observation
in the movie, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Bomb:
war is too important to be left to politicians. They have neither the
time, the training, nor the inclination for strategic thought. I can no
longer sit back and allow Communist infiltration, Communist
indoctrination, Communist subversion and the international
Communist conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily
fluids.309
This subpart examines the fallacy of viewing social, moral, and political
values as “diluting” antitrust analysis. Neo-classical economic theory did
not insulate antitrust authorities from lobbyists and political interest groups.
Indeed Microsoft and Intel increased their lobbying efforts after the
government commenced its antitrust prosecutions.310

Google, currently

under investigation for antitrust violations, is spending even more on
lobbyists (over $2 million alone between April and June 2011).311
Consequently the danger lies not in the inclusion of non-economic concerns
in antitrust’s goals, but as Part IV addresses, in the ensuing legal standard.
1. Antitrust’s Inherent Trade-offs
Even if antitrust technocrats, for normative reasons, limited antitrust to
economic goals, they cannot avoid non-economic values. Antitrust policy
has inherent tradeoffs. As Hayek noted, “[i]t is the essence of the economic
problem that the making of an economic plan involves the choice between
conflicting or competing ends--different needs of different people.”312 To
resolve the trade-offs, one invariably relies on political, social, and moral

309

DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB
(Columbia Pictures 1964).
310
Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17, at 1419, 1447.
311
Michael Liedtke, Google’s Lobbying Bill Tops Previous Record, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, July 21, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/googles-lobbying-billq2-2011_n_906149.html.
312
HAYEK, supra note 50, at 106.
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values.
To start with an easy case, suppose residents of a New England
community want to preserve their downtown, consisting largely of local
merchants.

They oppose the entry of a big-box retailer, which would

primarily serve the community.

The big-box retailer preaches to the

villagers the virtues of its lower priced, high quality goods and increased
consumer surplus. The community still objects. Should the government
dismiss the citizens’ behavior as irrational and permit the big-box retailer to
enter the New England community? If so, government paternalism could
override community preference.
A competition official, when asked this hypothetical, likely would
accept the consumers’ informed preference. The government, as the Court
recognized under its state action doctrine, can displace competition with an
anticompetitive regulatory program.313 Here consumers can sacrifice the
benefits of increased competition for other objectives, such as the pleasure
(and value) they derive from preserving their downtown’s quaintness.314
The harder case involves antitrust policy’s inherent trade-offs. Suppose
a merger of the town’s paper mills generates efficiencies that will benefit
only the company, with no prospect of being passed along to consumers.
Also suppose the efficiency gains (which include purchasing less
electricity) outweigh the likely price increase to consumers. Should these
efficiencies be counted in favor of a merger? The Antitrust Modernization
Commissioners disagreed.315

Commissioner Carlton, a University of

Chicago professor, argued yes. Commissioner Jacobson disagreed: “Any
313

City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
314
Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 447 F. Supp. 2d 230, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“Classic antitrust analysis must take into consideration the right of states to seek to further
other, and equally important, social goals, even at the expense of pure antitrust analysis.”),
aff’d, 408 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2005).
315
AMC REPORT, supra note 124, at 422-23.
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doubts that a consumer welfare standard better reflects the goals of the
antitrust laws than a standard based on total welfare will serve only to
undermine antitrust enforcement in the future.”316
Other trade-offs include (i) a potential increase in inter-brand
competition at the expense of reducing intra-brand competition,317 (ii)
offsetting a merger’s anti-competitive effects in one market with procompetitive benefits in another market,318 (iii) mergers and restraints that
yield dynamic efficiencies but also higher prices,319 (iv) mergers that yield
greater productive efficiencies but reduce product variety,320 and (v)
enabling firms to merge to attain productive efficiencies versus the political
and social implications of increased concentration321 and the competitive
distortions of firms too-big-and too-integral-to-fail.322
Now suppose, in our example of the paper mill merger, that some of the
316

Id. at 423.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890-92 (2007);
Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1572-73 (11th Cir.
1983) (“even if a negative effect on consumer welfare and competition can be shown to
flow from a restriction of intrabrand competition, the court must still look to any possible
pro-competitive effects on the interbrand market stemming from the intrabrand
restriction”).
318
2006 Guidelines Commentary, supra note 206, at 57 (“Inextricably linked out-ofmarket efficiencies, however, can cause the Agencies, in their discretion, not to challenge
mergers that would be challenged absent the efficiencies. This circumstance may arise, for
example, if a merger presents large procompetitive benefits in a large market and a small
anticompetitive problem in another, smaller market.”).
319
Id. at 49 (“Efficiencies in the form of quality improvements may also be sufficient
to offset anticompetitive price increases following a merger.”); OECD Policy Brief, supra
note 186, at 5 (“merger may cause prices to rise soon after consummation but it may also
bring about dynamic efficiencies that have positive non-price effects such as benefits from
new or improved products in the longer term.”).
320
2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 186, at § 6 (contending that not all reductions
in variety post-merger are anticompetitive as “some may reflect efficient consolidation of
products when variety offers little in value to customers”).
321
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 258-59 (2001).
322
Markham, supra note 34, at 270 (after antitrust officials permitted significant
concentration in the banking industry, some banks became too-integral-and-big-to-fail,
leaving policymakers with choosing “which among competing failures to cure via bailout
funding”).
317
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efficiencies will be passed on to some consumers, while other consumers
will pay higher prices.

One drafter of the 2010 Merger Guidelines

commented that the antitrust agencies may conclude that “the predicted
harm to relatively few customers is not substantial enough to warrant an
enforcement action, especially if the merger is expected to generate
cognizable efficiencies that will benefit a larger set of customers so
customers overall are likely to benefit from the merger.”323 This assertion,
like the other trade-offs, raises several issues.
First, should the antitrust agency determine whether some citizens
should bear the brunt of a merger, so that other citizens may benefit?
Suppose immediately after the merger, price will increase on the lower-end
products, but the merger may provide “positive non-price effects (e.g.,
benefits from new or improved products) in the longer term.”324

This

merger, as the OECD recognized, “puts investigators in the awkward
position of needing to compare different concepts from different time
periods–and possibly from two or more different markets with different sets
of consumers.”325
Second, it is questionable whether enforcers and generalist courts,
consistent with the rule of law, can assess how “much quality enhancement
or how many new products are necessary for some customers to compensate
for a given expected price increase affecting other customers” in other
markets.326 In assessing whether lower-incomer consumers (with a higher
marginal utility of money) should have to pay higher prices post-merger so
that wealthier consumers receive better quality products, the agencies’
decision will likely implicate political, social, and moral values.
323

Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in
Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 67 n.69 (2010).
324
OECD Dynamic Efficiencies, supra note 167, at 10.
325
Id.
326
Id.
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Third, even if the agencies could make this trade-off solely on economic
considerations, a political and social issue is whether they should. Arguably
individuals, as a quality of life matter, rather than an antitrust agency,
subject to the risk of regulatory capture, should determine whether the
potential innovation is significant enough to warrant the higher price. But
often consumers cannot make this decision independently. Mergers can
harm consumers in one market, while benefitting consumers in other
markets. So normative values come into play as to who should decide this
trade-off: the legislative branch, enforcement agency, or court?327
One recent case illustrates antitrust policy’s inherent trade-offs.328 The
state of California challenged under the antitrust laws a profit-sharing
agreement among several large southern California supermarket chains
during a labor strike.329 The major supermarkets advocated one trade-off:
even if their temporary profit-sharing agreement had reduced the
supermarkets’ incentives to compete in the short term, it increased their
chances of winning the labor dispute with their unionized employees.330
Thus the court would trade-off any short-term reduction in competition in
exchange for lowering retail prices to consumers over the long term. In
defeating the union, the supermarkets could lower their employee wages
and their costs, and thereby lower the retail prices charged to consumers.

327

United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (recognizing that a
“value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and
in any event has been made for us already, by Congress when it enacted the amended
[section] 7. Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It
therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully
aware, we must assume, that some price might have to be paid.”).
328
California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 08-55671, 2011 WL 2684942 (9th Cir.
July 12, 2011).
329
Id. at *1 (grocers agreed that in “a strike/lockout, any grocer that earned revenues
above its historical share relative to the other chains during the strike period would pay
15% of those excess revenues as reimbursement to the other grocers to restore their prestrike shares”).
330
Id. at *34 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting and concurring in part).
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Also by pooling profits over the short-term to defeat the union, the
supermarkets could better compete against other retailers over the longterm.
Rather than evaluate the competitors’ profit-pooling agreement under
the per se illegal or quick-look legal standards, the Ninth Circuit ultimately
left the parties and lower court to ramble through the wilds of economic
theory: it instructed a “fair consideration of all factors relevant under the
traditional rule of reason test, so as to determine if there are significant
anticompetitive impacts and if so whether they outweigh any legitimate
justifications.”331

Important here is that a decision will be made, and

entering that decision will be social, political, and moral concerns. Thus,
even under a pure economic approach, enforcers and courts will confront
complex trade-offs, whereby one group will benefit, another will be
harmed. And the price is not always clear. Each group can value the
benefits and costs of the trade-off differently, and some values are
incommensurable (such as fairness and liberty considerations in permitting
some consumers to be exploited so that others benefit).
2. Importance of Morals and Fairness to Support a Market Economy
Individuals, as repeatedly shown in the empirical behavioral economics
literature, do not predictably behave as neoclassical economic theory
posits.332

They do not delineate between economic and non-economic

considerations when considering fairness.333 They do not enter the
marketplace with a blank slate. Instead, years of socialization, and the
internalization of social, moral, ethical, and legal norms have already

331

Id. at *16. Since California stipulated that it would not challenge the restraint under
the rule of reason, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was a victory for defendants. Id. at *16 n.18.
332
See, e.g., Reeves & Stucke, supra note 237, at 1528-30 (collecting several
applications of behavioral economics).
333
Kahneman et al., Fairness, supra note 175, at 729.
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occurred.334
Thus any competition policy, in a world with humans, transaction costs,
coercion, and informational asymmetries, is built upon the normative
judgments of legal and informal institutions.335 Principles of ethics, morals
and fairness, rather than compromise, can strengthen a market economy.336
As most rights are qualified,337 normative legal judgments are involved
in creating, assigning, limiting, and protecting property rights338 and in the
initial and current distribution of assets. So one inquires the extent to which
property rights have a social mortgage “to ensure that the basic needs of
every [individual] are met and sustained.”339 Ultimately economics is not a
value-free science,340 inoculated from normative judgments.

334

HAYEK, supra note 50, at 125 (“The ultimate ends of the activities of reasonable
beings are never economic.”); Horton, supra note 49, at 475 (“neoclassical economists
have gone against the most basic principles of humanness, and our attendant inborn and
cultural standards of reciprosity, justice, and fairness”); C. Mantzavinos, The InstitutionalEvolutionary Antitrust Model, 22 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 273, 277 (2006) (“When consumers
and entrepreneurs begin participating in and exchanging on the market and competing with
each other, they are already socialized individuals, sharing a large number of social
rules.”).
335
Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
359, 361 (1994) (characterizing economic markets as typically imperfect and beset by high
transaction costs); Coase, supra note 269, at 717 (recognizing that once “we move from a
regime of zero transaction costs to one of positive transaction costs” the legal system’s
fundamental importance quickly becomes apparent).
336
See supra note 261.
337
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951).
338
Coase, supra note 269, at 717.
339
Letter from the Holy See to the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights of the WTO, Ethics Cannot Justify Fixing the Highest Prices for
Medicines, in L’Osservatore Romano (Vatican City), July 11, 2001, at 9,
http://www.catholicculture.org/library/view.cfm?recnum=3966&longdesc (presenting the
Holy See’s stance on the pharmaceutical industry’s responsibility to provide affordably
priced medications). For more on the social mortgage on capital, see generally CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE (David J. O’Brien & Thomas A.
Shannon eds., 2004).
340
F.M. Scherer, Conservative Economics and Antitrust: A Variety of Influences, in
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 73, at 31 (noting how
“economic propositions are among the least provable of those addressed in the various
sciences”).
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3. Praising Antitrust’s Purity Is Praising Its Irrelevancy
Even if technocrats somehow could exclude social, moral, and political
values from antitrust policy, they must still articulate how their work
improves well-being (or at least for their influential constituencies).
Antitrust monasteries are not feasible in democracies.
authorities seldom have unrestricted endowments.

Competition

Nor would many

politicians leave money outside the antitrust monastery so as to not pollute
the technocrats inside. Competition agencies compete with other agencies
for funding. So if antitrust policy is irrelevant to the pressing societal
issues, then antitrust, relegated to a niche organization with little resources,
is easier to marginalize.
Moreover, a plea for antitrust purity can divorce antitrust technocrats
from the public concerns. Some antitrust goals are important to the public
and Congress but dismissed by antitrust technocrats. Take, for example, the
goal of protecting small competitors. In one recent survey, “[a]bout 8 in 10
(81%) EU citizens agreed that small companies needed to be protected from
large companies’ competition.”341 Indeed more citizens “totally agree[d]”
with that statement than other statements considered antitrust gospel, such
as competition between companies allows for more choice342 and better
prices343 for consumers.344 This cannot be dismissed as European fancy.
Protecting smaller competitors was one concern underlying the legislative

341

Flash Eurobarometer: EU Citizens’ Perceptions about Competition Policy--Survey
Conducted by the Gallup Organization, upon the request of Directorate General for
Competition,
Flash
EB
Series
No.
264
7
(2009),
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_264_sum_en.pdf (51% “totally agree” and 30%
“somewhat agree”).
342
Id. (49% totally agree).
343
Id. (50% totally agree).
344
In all EU Member States (besides Denmark), over 70 percent of interviewees
agreed that small companies needed to be protected from large companies’ competition.
Id. at 11 (27% of the surveyed Danes “tended to disagree” and 14% “totally disagreed,”
whereas in all other Member Countries less than a quarter of respondents expressed
disagreement (between 7% and 22%)).
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amendments to the Clayton Act, the primary antitrust statute involving
mergers,345 and surveyed U.S. citizens had more confidence in small
businesses than big firms.346
But protecting small competitors, for some, is blasphemy.347 The
conventional wisdom is that the antitrust laws protect competition, not
competitors.348
From the technocrats’ perspective, the citizens, even the highlyeducated,349 are ill-informed.

From the citizens’ perspective, the

technocrats must recognize that protecting small companies represents an
important value to be independently protected; alternatively, the
technocrats, with their focus on static price competition and productive
efficiencies, cannot otherwise see, as citizens working in the private sector
can, the harms from concentrated economic power. Small start-ups, as one
recent study found, drive dynamic competition.

Start-ups that survive

“have higher productivity levels and higher productivity gains than more
mature establishments,” and help replace “lower productivity businesses
with new, more productive ones, thereby increasing productivity overall.”350
Start-ups create the bulk of private sector jobs in the United States.351
345

See supra note 55.
Dennis Jacobe, Americans Three Times as Confident in Small vs. Big Business-Confidence Gap Greater Now than Prior to the Recession and Financial Collapse, Gallup,
July 27, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/141578/Americans-Three-Times-ConfidentSmall-Big-Business.aspx.
347
AMC REPORT, supra note 124, at 34.
348
Id.
349
EU Citizen Survey, supra note 341, at 15 (“Respondents with a higher level of
education were also more likely to agree that mergers between large companies might
distort competition (75% vs. 61% of the least educated respondents)” but “were more likely
to doubt whether small companies should be protected from large companies’
competition”; 18% with a higher level of education disagreed with the latter former
statement, compared to 8% of the least educated).
350
Steven J. Davis et al., Turmoil and Growth: Young Businesses, Economic
Churning,
and
Productivity
Gains
4
(June
2008),
available
at
http://www.kauffman.org/research-and-policy/business-dynamics-statistics.aspx.
351
John Haltiwanger et al., Business Dynamics Statistics Briefing: Jobs Created from
346
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Consequently, antitrust officials who warn about social, moral, and
political values polluting antitrust analysis are not arguing for sound
competition analysis.352 They argue for an antitrust analysis divorced from
reality, a world occupied by self-interested profit-maximizers, unconcerned
about fairness and trust, in markets without transaction costs and property
rights.

In short, they render antitrust irrelevant.

The surveyed ICN

members considered “that the most important obstacle to their advocacy
work surges from the different objectives and opinions held by other
Governmental authorities.”353 Seeking to sequester competition goals from
moral, social, and political values will not bridge this divide.
IV. ACCOUNTING ANTITRUST’S MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES IN THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
As Part III discusses, any country’s competition law likely will
encompass, but not necessarily rank, multiple economic, social, moral, and
political goals.

The issue is not whether competition policy should

incorporate non-economic values. Rather, as this Part discusses, the issue is
the degree of freedom that courts and enforcers have in weighing multiple
goals in their analysis.
One issue is how to weigh multiple objectives, if as Part II discusses,
each objective has shortcomings. For example, promoting efficiency cannot
be the primary goal, as all the antitrust scholars and policymakers, taken
together, still would not know how to maximize dynamic, allocative, and

Business Startups in the United States; Second in a series of reports using data from the
U.S. Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics (Jan. 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352538 (comparing fraction of employment accounted for by
U.S. private-sector business startups with the average annual net employment growth of the
U.S. private sector over the 1980-2005 period and inferring “that, excluding the jobs from
new firms, the U.S. net employment growth rate is negative on average”).
352
HAYEK, supra note 50, at 100 (all collectivist systems feature the “deliberate
organization of the labors of society for a definite social goal”).
353
ICN Advocacy Report, supra note 91, at 72.
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productive efficiencies in the long run.354 As a German Bundeskartellamt
official said, we cannot pretend to know what in fact cannot be known.355
Another issue is whether the goals are better achieved directly (like the goal
of crossing the street) or obliquely.356
In reconsidering antitrust’s goals, policymakers should look at the
business literature, which after the financial crisis, is reconsidering
capitalism, “one imbued with a social purpose.”357 In the past, the concepts
of sustainability, fairness, and profitability generally were seen as
conflicting.358

But these concepts are seen as reinforcing under the

principle of shared value, which “involves creating economic value for
society by addressing its needs and challenges” and enhances “the
competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the
economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates.”359
Profits can be attained not through exploitation (e.g., creating demand for
harmful or useless products), but through collaboration and trust and in
better helping consumers solve their problems. Sustainability, rather than a
cost, represents an opportunity for companies to improve productivity and
societal welfare.360
So too important political, social, economic, and moral values can

354

Christian Ewald, Competition and Innovation: Dangerous “Myopia” of Economists
in Antitrust?, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 253, 261 (Autumn 2008).
355
Id.
356
KAY, supra note 236, at 195 (arguing that direct goals are appropriate (i) when the
environment is stable, (ii) the objectives are one-dimensional and transparent, and (iii) it is
possible to determine when, and whether, the goals have been achieved).
357
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent
Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb.
2011, at 77; Ikujiro Nonaka & Hirotaka Takeuchi, The Big Idea: The Wise Leader, HARV.
BUS. REV., May 2011, at 59 (moral purpose).
358
Porter & Kramer, supra note 357, at 64.
359
Id. at 64, 66.
360
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Roundtable on Pro-Active Policies for Green
Growth and the Market Economy--Note by the Delegation of the United States (Oct. 19,
2010), available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/international/269284.pdf.
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reinforce, rather than undermine, any concept of fair competition. Ideally
the politically accountable legislature (but given Congress’s reticence, more
likely the courts) would blend the multiple objectives into legal standards
that comport with rule-of-law principles.
A. Blending Antitrust’s Objectives
To illustrate how blending goals works, we can combine several popular
competition goals: Ensuring an effective competitive process by enhancing
efficiency, while promoting economic freedom, a level playing field for
small and mid-sized enterprises, and fairness.

In blending these goals,

lawmakers can hope to expand the range of entrepreneurial opportunity
seeking to satisfy any increasing consumer demand for choice.
As Part III discusses, the U.S. economy relies on new entrants for
productivity gains and job creation.

Promoting economic freedom and

opportunity and ensuring a level playing field for small and mid-sized
enterprises consequently will likely promote, rather than undermine,
dynamic efficiency.361

In addition, promoting these blended goals can

strengthen the network’s resilience.362

Ensuring a “multiplicity and

diversity of independently innovating firms,” observed Professor Kerber,
can (i) promote the “searching for new problem solutions and safeguarding
the effectiveness of competition as a process of parallel experimentation and
mutual learning,”363 and (ii) provide a faster adaptation to exogenous
shocks.364
The blended goal can also promote productive efficiencies. A low to
moderately concentrated industry with diverse competitors can offer greater
benefits to competitors, than a highly concentrated industry. One empirical
361

Fox, Efficiency Paradox, supra note 73, at 80.
Sally J. Goerner et al., Quantifying Economic Sustainability: Implications for FreeEnterprise Theory, Policy and Practice, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 76, 77 (2009).
363
Kerber, Maintaining Diversity, supra note 272, at 3.
364
Id. at 9; see also Horton, supra note 49, at 488, 491.
362
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study found a positive correlation between industry variety and
performance.365 In considering why the entire industry benefits when firms
pursue a variety of competitive strategies, the study’s authors posit that with
less variety, there will be less opportunity for the firms to learn of the
changing conditions and demands and appropriate responses thereto.366
Likewise, Michael Porter identified how competitors mutually gain from
localized competition, such as knowledge spillovers, improving the quality
of their labor pool, and strengthening their network of suppliers.367 A
diversity of local competitors can spur variety in products, as competitors
strive to differentiate from their rivals’ products, as well as in production
techniques and strategies, which can lead to further innovation.
1. A Blended Approach for Monopolist’s Exclusionary Behavior
One concern underlying economic freedom is when monopolists
through exclusionary behavior seek to stifle the introduction of variation or
otherwise impede the market’s feedback mechanism.368 Entrenched firms
jointly or unilaterally seek to limit the introduction of variation by entrants
and consumers’ ability to experiment with new products or services.369

365

Grant Miles et al., Industry Variety and Performance, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 163,
166-72 (1993). The study also found that such variety decreased as the industry matured
and declined. Id. at 172.
366
Id. at 174.
367
MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 662-69 (1990);
Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity Approach, in UNIQUE VALUE:
COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION CREATING UNIQUE VALUE 161-65 (Charles D.
Weller et al., eds. 2004); see also DAVIDSON, supra note 52, at 96, 152-53. By analogy,
plant species compete for pollinators (bees). But in mutualistic networks, the more plant
species that grow in a field, the more pollinators are attracted to the area, so the different
plant species stand to gain more when they co-exist. Jordi Bascompte, Disentangling the
Web of Life, SCIENCE, July 24, 2009, at 416, 418.
368
JOHNSON, supra note 203, at 41; EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS
15-15, 146 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing how information exchange, trialability, and
observability are crucial in the innovation-development process).
369
See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. F.T.C., 635 F.3d 815, 822 (6th Cir. 2011) (FTC
successfully challenging Realcomp’s website and search-function policies that restricted
limited-services discount brokers’ publishing and marketing nontraditional listings).

76

RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS

[11-Aug-11

One recent example is Intel.370 The FTC alleged that the monopolist
sought to block or slow the adoption of competitive products by, among
other things, paying or otherwise inducing suppliers of complementary
software and hardware products to eliminate or limit their support of nonIntel microprocessors. Intel allegedly induced computer manufacturers “to
forgo advertising, to forgo branding, to forgo certain distribution channels,
and/or to forgo promotion of computers containing non-Intel CPUs.”371
Suppose Intel could prove during the complaint period that microprocessor
prices actually declined at an annual rate of 42 percent (a price decrease
greater than for any other high-technology product) and output of its x86
microprocessors grew from 136.5 million to 324.7 million.372 If allocative
and productive efficiency were the antitrust goals, the FTC would have a
hard time showing that absent Intel’s conduct, prices likely would have
been lower and output greater.
But under a blended goal, the FTC could show how Intel’s conduct
inhibited its competitors from effectively marketing their products to
customers, which also harmed choice (and competition) at the downstream
original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and consumer levels, and reduced
the OEMs’ incentive and ability to innovate and differentiate their products
in ways that would appeal to customers.373 Under a blended goal, the
competition authority more likely would follow “the concept of rivalry and
consumer choice as the essential conditions for guaranteeing competition
and sustainable incentives for innovation.”374
This blended approach is not novel. The European Commission infers
370

Admin. Compl., In re Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf.
371
Id. at ¶ 52.
372
Answer, In re Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 31, 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091231respanswertocmplt.pdf.
373
Intel Compl., supra note 370, at ¶ 94.
374
Drexl, Real Knowledge, supra note 200.
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anti-competitive effects when a monopolist “prevents its customers from
testing the products of competitors or provides financial incentives to its
customers on condition that they do not test such products, or pays a
distributor or a customer to delay the introduction of a competitor’s
product.”375

In curtailing the available antitrust defenses for a group

boycott, the Supreme Court implicitly blended these goals.376

And as

Hayek argued, it is “essential that entry into the different trades should be
open to all on equal terms and that the law should not tolerate any attempts
by individuals or groups to restrict this entry by open or concealed force.”377
A blended objective would promote economic opportunity without
unduly penalizing more efficient firms from competing. Economic freedom
does not mean economic equality.378 One cannot assume that all sellers
have the same “best practices” and routines, or the same quality of goods
and services. Under the blended approach, antitrust would not require a
competitor to degrade the quality of its products or services or otherwise
punish firms that succeed because of their superior efficiency or product
offerings. So a business that loses sales because of its inability to solve the
consumers’ problems “is not the victim of economic oppression, but of [its]
own inefficient methods.”379 In determining whether the monopolist’s
challenged conduct is exclusionary and unreasonably restrains other
375

Communication from the European Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (2009/C 45/02) & 22, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:PDF.
376
Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (group
boycotts cripple traders’ freedom to sell in accordance with their own judgment);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 16 (1945) (challenged boycott limits
opportunity and initiative of potential entrants).
377
HAYEK, supra note 50, at 86.
378
BOK, supra note 285, at 95 (describing equal opportunity as “giving everyone a
more equal chance to become sufficiently educated and informed to resist exploitation and
to defend themselves by appealing to the courts or to their political representatives when
arbitrary restraints and disadvantages do occur”).
379
Blake & Jones, Defense of Antitrust, supra note 240, at 398.
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competitors’ economic freedom, the competition authority can consider
whether the challenged conduct is capable of excluding an equally efficient
competitor.380
2. A Blended Approach for Media Industries
Media industries provide another example of the importance in blending
economic and non-economic goals. In some industries, with high fixed
costs and homogeneous products, consumers do not desire product variety.
Consumers prefer mergers that enable firms to achieve economies of scale
by rationalizing production lines. But for media industries, consumers may
desire product variety from competing independent news sources even at
the cost of some efficiency. The product variety yields a desired outcome
(vibrant marketplace of ideas), which in turn promotes the quality-of-life
factors important for well-being.381
Under a blended goal, cost-savings efficiencies are relevant, when they
demonstrably yield greater output of better quality programming.382 But
under a blended goal, antitrust policy will not focus entirely on short-term
productive efficiencies and competitive advertising rates. This was the
380

See, e.g., Luc Peeperkorn & Katja Viertio, Implementing an Effects-based
Approach to Article 82, COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSLETTER, at 17 (No. 1 2009),
ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2009_1_5.pdf
(outlining
European
Commission’s standard to assess whether dominant firm’s pricing conduct is capable of
foreclosing equally efficient hypothetical competitors).
381
For our discussion of how a vibrant marketplace of ideas can promote civic
engagement and governance, increase political accountability, reduce corruption, inform
policymakers of the unintended social effects of their policies, and provide a voice to
pressure the government for change, see Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, Plurality of
Public Opinions and the Concentration of Media, in GENERAL REPORTS OF THE XVIIITH
CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Karen B. Brown &
David V. Snyder eds. Springer forthcoming 2012); Stucke & Grunes, Antitrust Immunity,
supra note 35, at 128-29.
382
A concern about productive efficiencies can also prevent the government from
requiring too much market fragmentation thereby depriving the media of scale economies
and investing the savings in journalism. Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European
Commission Responsible for Competition Policy, Competition in Digital Media and the
Internet,
SPEECH/10/365,
(July
7
2010),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/365&format=HTM
L&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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DOJ’s mistake in the past antitrust policy cycle when reviewing radio
mergers. Consumers suffered as a result.
In 1996, Congress and the FCC relaxed the media ownership rules.383
They did so under the banner of promoting competition and reducing
regulation “to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies.”384 Not surprisingly, immediately after
the 1996 Telecom Act, there was, one Clinton administration official
remarked, an “explosion of radio mergers.”385 In analyzing radio mergers,
the DOJ considered their economic impact solely with respect to advertisers
and the rates they paid.386 Even though other possible product markets
existed, such as listenership and programming, the DOJ consent decrees
never addressed the merger’s likely impact on programming quality,
listener choice, or on the marketplace of ideas.387

Despite the rising

industry concentration, the DOJ challenged few radio mergers.388

It

required firms to divest radio stations in only those highly concentrated
markets where it predicted advertisers would likely pay higher rates.389
383

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56, 111-12
(1996) (inter alia eliminating limits on the number of AM or FM broadcast stations which
one entity may own or control nationally); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (eliminating national
multiple radio ownership rule and relaxing local ownership rule). Congress also permitted
greater concentration in local radio markets and a company to own or control a network of
broadcast stations and a cable system.
384
110 Stat. at 56 (1996).
385
Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., DOJ
Analysis
of
Radio
Mergers
(Feb.
19,
1997),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/1055.pdf.
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Id.; Stucke & Grunes, Antitrust Immunity, supra note 35, at 128.
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Stucke & Grunes, Antitrust Immunity, supra note 35, at 129-34.
388
In the first year of the 1996 Act, there were over 1,000 radio mergers, of which the
DOJ reviewed 140. Klein, supra note 385.
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In the two years after the 1996 Act, the DOJ filed eight cases to restructure radio
mergers; three additional deals were restructured or abandoned without going to court.
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Justice Department Requires CBS to Sell Seven Radio
Stations as Part of American Radio Systems Acquisition (Mar. 31, 1998),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1998/1618.htm.
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Although Congress amended the Clayton Act in 1950 to arrest
“concentration in the American economy, whatever its cause, in its
incipiency,”390 the DOJ official called the concentration in the radio
industry “healthy” given the potential for efficiencies.391 The ensuing
consolidation

adversely

impacted

non-price

competition,

such

as

programming quality and programming choices for listeners.392 Moreover,
the industry consolidation adversely affected advertising rates, which
ironically was the DOJ’s sole focus.393 Mel Karmazin, the former head of
commercial radio for Infinity Broadcasting and CBS and the current CEO
of Sirius XM, recognized that commercial radio after the 1996 Act became
“totally homogenized.”394 Karmazin advocated for radio consolidation
“[s]trictly for business reasons. No one asked [him] if it was good for
consumers.”395
By blending goals, lawmakers can enable smaller media firms to grow
through mergers. But rather than embrace concentration as “healthy” and
consider the mergers’ effect only on advertising rates, antitrust officials
390

United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551 (1966).
Klein, supra note 385. Between 1996 and 2010, the number of radio station owners
decreased 39 percent (5,133 to 3,143 owners). Federal Commc’ns Comm’n, Notice Of
Inquiry, In the Matter of 2010 Quadrennial Regulatory Review–Review of the
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section
202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, MB Docket No. 09-182 12 (May 25, 2010),
http://govpulse.us/entries/2010/06/11/2010-14099/2010-quadrennial-regulatory-reviewreview-of-the-commission-s-broadcast-ownership-rules-and-other-ru.
392
Stucke & Grunes, Antitrust Immunity, supra note 35, at 116-29 (identifying several
market failures after the 1996 Act). As one FCC Commissioner commented, “It is difficult
to fully quantify the harmful effects that media consolidation has had on the news,
information and entertainment we receive. Fewer and fewer voices do not an informed
electorate and robust democracy make.” FCC Opens Notice of Inquiry into Media
Ownership Rules, RADIO BUS. REP., May 25, 2010, http://www.rbr.com/medianews/24495.html.
393
Stucke & Grunes, Antitrust Immunity, supra note 35, at 130 (between 1998 and
2006 radio listening declined while radio advertising rates nearly doubled).
394
Phil Rosenthal, Homogenized Radio Stations Bottle up Growth, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
11, 2007, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-11-11/business/0711100015_1_siriussatellite-radio-radio-stations-mel-karmazin.
395
Id.
391

11-Aug-11]

RECONSIDERING ANTITRUST’S GOALS

81

would be skeptical about monopolies or tolerating mergers in already
concentrated industries to yield additional productive efficiencies.
B. Risks and Benefits of a Blended Approach
As Professor Louis Schwartz observed, “The difficult question is not
whether non-economic considerations are a proper, indeed conventional,
component of the antitrust calculus, but how to take them into account.”396
A trade-off exists between antitrust goals and legal standards. With a
narrowly defined antitrust objective, one can use an open-ended, factspecific weighing standard, such as the rule of reason. The specific goal
limits the enforcers’ and courts’ discretion when weighing the facts, as the
goal permits only one outcome. Alternatively, one can have multiple (and
conflicting) policy objectives, if they are synthesized into clear rules that
market participants can internalize and follow.
One sees this trade-off in past antitrust cycles. Up until the late 1970s,
the Court recognized antitrust’s multiple economic and non-economic
goals.

Accordingly, the Court generally (but not always) sought four

things. First, it sought a legal standard that was administrable for generalist
judges.397 With some exceptions, the Court turned to the legislative history
or common law precedent as a basis for its standards.398 Second, the Court
sought legal standards to enhance predictability. For example, in devising
the thirty percent market share presumption for mergers, the Court sought to
foster business autonomy: Unless business executives “can assess the legal
consequences of a merger with some confidence, sound business planning is

396

Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 1076, 1080 (1979).
397
See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) (“in any
case in which it is possible, without doing violence to the congressional objective
embodied in . . . [the statute], to simplify the test of illegality, the courts ought to do so in
the interest of sound and practical judicial administration”).
398
Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17, at 1402-03.
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retarded.”399 The Court’s role was to provide clearer guidance on what was
civilly (and criminally) illegal under the Sherman Act. Third, the Court
sought to prevent the lower courts from being bogged down in difficult
economic problems, such as trade-offs between inter- and intra-brand
competition.400 Fourth, not only was this weighing beyond its institutional
competence, the Court recognized that the legislature, while subject to rentseeking, was more politically accountable than the judiciary; so Congress
must make these normative trade-offs.401
In the past policy cycle, the Court went the opposite direction. It
increasingly emphasized one type of competition (static price competition)
and one antitrust goal (consumer welfare) and deemphasized antitrust’s
political, moral, and social objectives. The Court increasingly narrowed the
applicability of its per se illegal standard and broadened the applicability of
its more fact-intensive, case-specific rule-of-reason inquiry.402
One risk of the blended goal approach, therefore, is incorporating
multiple goals into the Court’s prevailing legal standard, the rule-of-reason.
One cannot have, consistent with the rule of law, a fact-specific weighing
standard and multiple policy objectives. Having the agencies and courts
blend goals in every antitrust case is a recipe for disaster.403

399

It is

Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S at 362.
See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (neither courts
nor litigants could weigh the reduction of competition in one area (e.g., intra-brand
competition for Topco private-label products among Topco member supermarkets) versus
greater competition in another area (e.g., inter-brand competition between Topco members’
and the major supermarkets’ private-label goods)); Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17,
at 1404-05.
401
Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17, at 1405-6.
402
Id. at 1407-15; see e.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 08-55671, 2011
WL 2684942, at *11 (9th Cir. July 12, 2011) (noting Supreme Court’s reluctance to adopt
per se rules where practice’s economic impact is not immediately obvious).
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questionable whether antitrust enforcers and courts can operationalize
multiple goals in a systematic fashion.404 Moreover, allowing them to blend
goals provides greater freedom to make errors and be politically captured.
Accordingly, if courts and antitrust enforcers acknowledge antitrust’s
traditional political, social, and moral goals, then the rule of reason cannot
be antitrust’s prevailing legal standard. Instead, they must blend such goals
into clearer rules and legal presumptions. Ultimately, the debate is which is
the better trade-off: a single well-defined goal/rule-of-reason standard
versus multiple goals/clearer rules.
As this article discusses, the quest for a single well-defined goal has
failed. Thus antitrust is adrift under the rule-of-reason. On the other hand,
one drafter of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, in praising the Guidelines’
flexibility, doubted the business community’s desire to return to the 1960s
antitrust policies: “Accounting for the real-world business conditions in
which a merger takes place is worthwhile, even if doing so means that some
simplicity must be sacrificed to achieve greater accuracy in merger
enforcement.”405
On one level, he is correct. Companies seeking to merge in highly
concentrated industries prefer a fact-intensive weighing standard than a
presumption of illegality. At times a competitively neutral or beneficial
merger violates the simpler standard. Moreover, the rule of reason enables
the agencies and courts to respond flexibly to resolve novel problems that
continually emerge over time.
But this thinking, common in the past antitrust cycle, rests on two

cases).
404

Lisa D. Ordóñez et al., Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of OverPrescribing Goal Setting, Harv. Bus. School No. 09-083 7 (2009),
www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-083.pdf (noting how individuals with multiple goals are
prone to concentrate on one goal).
405
Shapiro, supra note 323, at 59.
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assumptions: first for most mergers and restraints a fact-intensive rule-ofreason analysis yields greater accuracy; second, the business community
prefers the rule-of-reason analysis.

These assumptions, as I explore

elsewhere,406 are empirically suspect. No one knows whether the 1992 or
2010 Merger Guidelines increased accuracy, as no one systemically
evaluated post-merger whether the agency accurately predicted the merger’s
competitive effects.

Indeed, by weighing some factors (claimed

efficiencies) and not others (editorial competition), as the DOJ’s review of
radio mergers reflects, the fact-intensive inquiry can lead to a worse
outcome—higher ad rates, poorer quality, and a less robust marketplace of
ideas. There is no empirical evidence that courts and antitrust enforcers
systematically optimize efficiency across industries through its vague ruleof-reason standard.
Nor is there any evidence that firms prefer the costly, time-intensive
rule-of-reason analysis to clearer rules. Several factors suggest that the
contrary. First, simpler rules that emphasize a limited number of structural
factors can facilitate “both enforcement decision-making and business
planning which involves anticipation of the Department’s enforcement
intent.”407 If courts, with the assistance of antitrust lawyers, have difficulties
applying the rule-of-reason, corporate counsel will also have a hard time
advising their clients on the conduct’s legality, and it will be hard for
employees to internalize norms of what is reasonable and unreasonable
behavior.
Second, as private and public antitrust enforcement increases globally,
the costs from uncertain and inconsistent legal outcomes will likely
406

Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17, at 1421-73 (discussing how antitrust in the
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increase. Thus the demand for convergence increases. Convergence can
occur on two levels: goals and/or legal standards. As the ICN surveys
show, competition authorities have not converged, nor will they likely
converge, on a single well-defined antitrust goal. The newer antitrust
regimes are unlikely, especially after the financial crisis, to regress to a
simplistic conception of competition and quest for a single economic goal.
Countries that are adopting or revising their competition laws are not
condemned to repeat the failures of U.S. antitrust policy, such as debating,
as some Chicago and post-Chicago school adherents did, over a single
economic goal.
Consequently, any global convergence will be on the legal standards.
With different antitrust objectives, however, one cannot expect the same
legal standards. So the convergence will not be over the substance of the
standard, but the extent to which the legal standard conforms to rule-of-law
principles. Multi-national companies likely will demand convergence on
legal standards that provide greater transparency, objectivity, accuracy, and
predictability. They increasingly will demand clearer rules that their
employees can easily internalize (and reduce compliance costs), that will
bind them and their competitors, and that will enable them to reasonably
anticipate what actions would be prosecuted so they can channel their
behavior in welfare-enhancing directions.408

As the recent ICN survey

observed, “A clearly set and uniformly enforced standard is, therefore, of
utmost relevance for enforcement agencies, the business community and
final consumers.”409 Accordingly, any future convergence will not be over
antitrust’s goals (that effort proved unsuccessful in the past policy cycle) or
on particular legal standards. Any convergence will come initially from
increasing the transparency of antitrust’s legal standards (and bringing them
408
409

2011 ICN Survey, supra note 47, at 88.
Id. (emphasis added).
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closer to the rule-of-law ideals).
This makes the Court’s rule-of-reason standard an unattractive export,
especially to countries with less developed judiciaries. Firms will unlikely
want to waste the extraordinary time and expense of a rule-of-reason
analysis in China, Russia, the United States, or European Union. This does
not mean a return to per se illegal standards or death of the rule of reason,
which courts and agencies could continue to employ in novel cases. Instead
for most run-of-the-mill restraints (such as RPM), the demand for, and
supply of, more administrable standards, such as presumptions of illegality,
with well-defined exceptions or defenses, will increase. The challenge will
be “how to strike a balance between the gains of a more effects-based
approach and a higher degree of tailor-made decisions on the one hand, and
the extra resources that are needed to achieve this and less legal certainty on
the other hand.”410
As the Court neglected in the past antitrust cycle, “[l]egal requirements
are prescribed by legislatures and courts, not by economic science.”411 To
the extent economic theories continue to lead the U.S. courts, the trend in
economics is toward more complex, yet realistic, conceptions of
competition and market participants.

Accordingly, businesses and the

antitrust bar will be more skeptical about enforcers’ and courts’ abilities to
predict competitive outcomes or maximize efficiency in those markets
through the rule of reason.

They increasingly will demand simpler

standards, more in accord with the rule of law, that incorporate antitrust’s
blended goals.
Thus, in the next policy cycle, antitrust’s legal standards can shift in two
ways. First, as recently signaled in linkLine, the Court can shift from a
410
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411
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“case-by-case” rule-of-reason analysis, which focuses on the “particular
facts disclosed by the record”412 to simpler antitrust standards and rules
“clear enough for lawyers to explain them to clients.”413 Second, the
standards may shift, whenever feasible, from directly regulating market
participants’ behavior to maintaining a competitive structure and preserving
freedom therein.
Besides increasing demand for better legal standards, a blended goal
approach increases antitrust’s salience. Currently to achieve consensus,
antitrust relies on ill-defined goals, like promoting consumer welfare. The
current debate over a total versus consumer surplus standard may interest
antitrust technocrats, but few others. Moreover, the debate over antitrust
goals is no longer a domestic affair.
One question is why should countries adopt antitrust laws. With the
realignment of economic power, the future debate over the purpose of
antitrust law will likely be between a “Democracy Consensus” and
“Authoritarian Consensus.” To the extent the Beijing Consensus continues
in its present form (a far from certain conclusion414), and to the extent
maximizing productive and allocative efficiency is antitrust’s goal, then
China can claim the advantage. The authoritarian government can claim
that the rule of law, democracy, and individual freedoms are unnecessary to
secure this economic goal. Indeed antitrust is one of several industrial
policies to promote efficiency.
The Democracy Consensus, however, can reply that antitrust’s primary
aim is not simply to lower price, but to prevent the formation of powerful

412
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firms and state-controlled enterprises that threaten a dynamic economy and
democracy. The “competitive system,” wrote Hayek, “is the only system
designed to minimize by decentralization the power exercised by man over
man.”415 The Democracy Consensus, consistent with this broader concept
of competition, can emphasize the importance of economic, personal, and
political freedoms for their own sake, as well as their promoting dynamic
efficiencies and well-being. Antitrust’s salience accordingly increases.
CONCLUSION
Other than for idealists, competition policy in any democracy with
reasonable pluralism cannot be reduced to a single, well-defined goal. Any
antitrust policy, which seeks to promote well-being, must balance multiple
political, social, moral, and economic objectives.
The quest in the United States for a single economic goal was a failure.
No consensus was ever reached on a specific well-defined goal. The quest
did not significantly improve antitrust analysis or align it closer to rule-oflaw principles.

Antitrust’s current objectives of promoting consumer

welfare and efficiency are poorly defined. Its prevailing rule-of-reason
legal standard fares poorly under rule-of-law principles.

The quest

distanced antitrust from important policy issues (such as systemic risk) and
rendered antitrust less relevant.
Consequently now is the time to reconsider antitrust’s political, social,
and moral concerns. In reconsidering the goals of competition as a means
to secure political, economic, and individual freedoms, antitrust can be
more responsive to the citizens’ concerns about promoting well-being.
With a blended goal approach incorporated in better legal standards,
antitrust, in the next policy cycle, will be harder to marginalize.

415

HAYEK, supra note 50, at 166.

